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‘GIMME SHELTER’:
THE HIDDEN CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

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ABSTRACT

What are the causes and consequences of internal displacement during civil conflicts? This dissertation makes two general claims: First, internal displacement is often the intentional byproduct of territorial consolidation during civil wars. Non-state actors face a particular incentive to induce displacement as a means to increase their hold on territory in both the long and short term. Forced migrants are more likely to relocate within the state when displaced by a non-state actor, becoming internally displaced persons rather than refugees. Second, internal displacement can be seen as a factor that influences the outcome of civil wars themselves. Wide-scale displacement leads to notable increases in civil war duration. As such, this dissertation refines our collective understanding of the causes of internal displacement while at the same time calling attention to the potentially severe effects of displacement on civil war resolution. This project examines these claims through the use of unique micro-level data on the Colombian Civil War as well as cross-national investigations of internal displacement and civil war duration.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

In terms of natural beauty, there are few places as idyllic as Santa Marta, Colombia and the surrounding Tayrona National Park. Once the first Spanish settlement in present-day Colombia, the ocean-side city is the launching point for those who would enjoy the stunning beaches and untouched jungles of Tayrona. In the city itself, a throng of vacationers and locals both pour into the streets as the sun sets over the coastal mountains, each of them looking to take advantage of the local nightlife and various Epicurean delights on offer.

However, life in Santa Marta was not always so peaceful. The relative geographic distance of the city from the interior of Colombia gave rise to a similar ideological remove: Santa Marteanos (persons from Santa Marta) have historically leaned left of center as compared to the rest of the country. This ideological remove eventually put Santa Marta on the front line of the long-running Colombian Civil War: As a result of both local sentiments and favorable geography, Santa Marta and its surrounding regions became a stronghold of the Marxist insurgency known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) during the 1980s and 1990s.

As a result, Santa Marta was the locus of a coordinated effort between government forces and paramilitaries attempting to eliminate the FARC after the failed ceasefire of 1997. Unsurprising for a major city caught in the midst of a civil war, Santa Marteanos were forced to leave their homes by the tens of thousands. Perhaps more surprisingly, it seems that this wave of forced displacement followed a particular logic, as indicated by the disparity in election results both preceding and following the offensive into the Santa Marta region. As can be seen in Figure 1, the wave of internal displacement coincides with an ideological inversion of Santa Marta's traditional voting patterns. Whereas Santa Marta had traditionally been a stronghold of the Colombian left, vote shares for the right-wing Alvaro Uribe were a full 14 percentage points higher in 2002 than they had been for

conservative Andres Pastrana during the 1998 election. Moreover, this ideological switch seems to have held over time, as vote shares during the 2006 election leaned similarly to the right (see Figure 1).

While this ideological switch could easily be a coincidence or the result of some other extant factor, the tie between forced displacement of civilians by paramilitaries connected to eventual

President Álvaro Uribe¹ and the suddenly conservative nature of Santa Marta’s voting results merits investigation simply because it presents a picture of forced migration that belies our traditional view of the phenomenon. Rather than existing as the unfortunate byproduct of wartime violence,




Figure 1: Internal Displacement and Conservative Vote Shares in Santa Marta, Colombia

forced migration can thus be conceived as the intentional byproduct of wartime strategies utilized by belligerents to accomplish the goal of exerting long-term ideological control over specific portions of territory.

This project seeks to shed light on the phenomenon of internal displacement as it occurs during civil conflicts, hoping to uncover the relationship between civil conflict dynamics and forced migration. Specifically, I argue that internal displacement arises as the result of targeting strategies

¹ Known as the *parapolítica* or “*paraUribismo*” scandal, numerous Colombian politicians within Uribe’s regime have been accused or convicted of ties to the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). In total, 139 members of Congress were investigated, leading to the convictions of five governors and thirty-two lawmakers, including Álvaro Uribe’s cousin (Mario Uribe Escobar) and brother (Santiago Uribe) (BBC, 2016). Álvaro Uribe himself has yet to be definitively convicted of connections to the paramilitaries despite numerous accusations from both former lawmakers and AUC members. To this day, Uribe maintains a page on his personal website dedicated to deflecting accusations regarding his alleged connections to paramilitary groups (Uribe, 2013).

employed by non-state belligerents seeking to consolidate control over specific portions of territory. To investigate this theory, I employ both cross-national and sub-national studies of internal displacement during civil conflict to assess the various factors that lead to displacement. In addition, I examine the effects of internal displacement during civil conflict, finding evidence to suggest that internal displacement can exacerbate the duration of civil conflicts themselves. Below, I review the extant literature on forced migration and internal displacement during civil war.

Current Theory and Evidence

As of December 2015, an estimated 40.8 million persons were displaced within their own countries as a result of conflict and violence, raising the global total of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to more than double the global total of refugees (IDMC, 2016). Despite this, IDPs receive comparatively little attention within the forced migration literature. The majority of scholarship in this area tends to focus on refugees rather than the internally displaced, perhaps due both to the paucity of data sources on IDPs and the degree to which refugees directly affect states throughout the world. When scholars have addressed the plight of the internally displaced, they tend to focus either on the individual-level causes and consequences of forced migration, or simply lump IDPs alongside refugees into a larger category of “forced migrants.”

Generally, the forced migration literature has come to the rather intuitive conclusion that, *ceteris paribus*, higher levels of violence lead to higher levels of forced migration (Hakovirta 1986; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989; Morrison and May, 1994; Schmeidl 1995, 1997; Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2007; Edwards 2009)². However, actual patterns of internal displacement belie this fairly straightforward relationship. For example, Colombia has

² Scholars differ in their measures of violence as it relates to forced migration, but the general consensus is that violence, broadly conceived, leads to larger numbers of forced migrants.

experience some of the highest levels of internal displacement in the world, despite (at least recently) having comparatively lower levels of violence than other conflicts with lower displacement totals. Additionally, the Colombian government has attempted a number of legislative solutions to the crisis of internal displacement, most recently 2011's "Ley de Víctimas," or Victim's Law. Despite these efforts, Colombia currently contains over 6.2 million internally displaced persons, ranking the country second in the world behind Syria (IDMC, 2016).

Beyond the tragedy of millions of persons forced from their homes, internal displacement in Colombia has drastically altered the economic landscape of the country. As in many Latin American countries, land is livelihood in rural Colombia, and the forced displacement of civilians has gone hand in hand with the acquisition of valuable land by armed groups. In the past thirty years of conflict, an estimated 13.3 million acres (12.6% of Colombia's viable agricultural land) have wrongfully changed hands due to displacement (Summers, 2011). For Colombians, the result is a return to the inequality that characterizes much of Latin America's past: Colombia now ranks as the most unequal country in the region in terms of land ownership, with 1.15% of landowners controlling 52.2% of all cultivatable land (Summers, 2011).

As of this writing, the Colombian government is in talks with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) to end the country's more than 50-year long civil war. While many commentators have cited the issue of political participation by leftist groups as a stumbling block for peace talks (Dennis, 2015), few have recognized that the existence of 6.2 million internally displaced persons (nearly 13% of the country's total population) may play a role in the conflict's resolution, despite evidence that formerly displaced persons make up a significant chunk of the fighters in Colombia's various armed groups (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2008). Moreover, the continuous flow of internally displaced persons in Colombia puts further stress on limited government

resources, hampering the degree to which the government could utilize those resources to end the war.

Before moving on, it is important to clarify some terms. For the purposes of this project, I rely on the UNHCR classifications of refugees and IDPs. According to the UNHCR, the term “refugee” classifies a person who:

Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [sic] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his [sic] former habitual residence of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1999)

Similarly, the UNHCR classifies internally displaced persons (IDPs) as those who flee their homes due to similar threats, but are unable or unwilling to cross an international border. For simplicity, I utilize “forced migrants” to refer to the larger category of IDPs and refugees together. Additionally, I identify two categories of belligerent during civil conflict, which I refer to as “state” or “government” actors and “non-state” or “dissident” actors. When using “belligerent” or “armed group,” I am referring to either or both of these parties.

Despite its provenance, internal displacement has only recently become the subject of empirical analysis. Peterson (1958) developed a conceptual framework for studying the strategic calculations made by potential migrants, later taken up by Kunz (1973). This framework distinguished different types of migratory behavior based not only on the factors leading to displacement (termed “push” factors), but those that lead to relocation in another place (“pull” factors). This conceptual framework has guided much of the scholarly work regarding forced migration, with a number of studies verifying the predominant theory that higher levels of violence beget higher numbers of forced migrants (Hakovirta 1986; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989; Morrison and May, 1994; Schmeidl 1995, 1997; Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2007; Edwards 2009; Adhikari 2012, 2013).

A number of studies have investigated the degree to which sources of violence drive displacement, finding that both dissident and government-perpetrated violence are positively related to the scale of displacement (Apodaca 1998; Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; Gibney, Apodaca, and McCann 1996; Jonassohn 1993; Rummel 1994; Schmeidl 1997; Moore and Shellman 2004, 2007). However, in attempting to investigate the causes of forced migration generally, these studies have failed to capture the distinct processes that lead migrants to become IDPs rather than refugees. Most of these studies utilize either total migration flows (the sum total of refugees and IDPs) or focus only on refugees. I demonstrate in this dissertation that, by failing to distinguish the threats presented to potential migrants by state and non-state actors, existing theories are hard-pressed to explain internal displacement versus international flight. Moreover, I show that the threats faced by the potentially displaced are not homogenous amongst the entire civilian population. While violence and the threat of violence are certainly primary factors leading to displacement, the degree to which these threats are felt by any one individual is dependent upon that individual's relationship to the belligerent responsible for those threats, as well as the degree to which the given individual's affinity for one or another side can be easily ascertained or ascribed – a factor that I call “identifiability.” In this sense, targeted violence is a mechanism for inducing the removal of individuals within contested territory who, for whatever reason, are unable or unwilling to switch their allegiances to the area's dominant belligerent.

Moore and Shellman (2006) were the first to disaggregate both sources of violence and types of forced migrants, finding that civil wars tend to increase the proportion of IDPs relative to refugees while violence perpetrated by state actors tends to increase the proportion of refugees relative to IDPs. Steele (2009, 2011) as well as Steele and Balcells (2012) use sub-national analyses of internal displacement in Colombia and Spain to show that levels of displacement vary depending on community characteristics, civilian loyalties, the type of violence employed by armed groups, and the

degree to which information about civilian loyalties can be ascertained by belligerents. Moreover, Steele and Balcells (2012) compare the conflicts in Colombia and Spain to show that levels of displacement do not vary across types of civil conflict, since the motivations for armed groups to induce displacement remain unchanged.

Other studies on internal displacement have focused more on the individual-level causes and consequences of forced migration. For example, extensive ties to the community via social networks can influence potential migrants to stay in the face of threats to personal security (Colletta and Cullen, 2000; Harpviken 2009; Varshney 2002; Wood 2008). Likewise, personal wealth or the state of local industries can influence an individual's decision to leave or stay (Adhikari 2012, 2013).

While the above studies give tremendous insight into the causes of forced migration, they fail to explain why levels of forced migration (particularly in the case of IDPs) fluctuate so wildly from conflict to conflict, especially those with relatively similar levels of violence. Edwards (2009) pointed out the importance of building a predictive model of forced migration, in that such a model could greatly assist efforts to care for these populations at risk. If a predictive model is a goal of forced migration research, current scholarship falls far short.

Additionally, the current state of research on forced migration has little to say about the potential effects of forced migrants, particularly IDPs. While a few scholars have posited that forced migrants can lead to notable security consequences (Lischer 2005; Loescher 1993; Teitelbaum 1984; Stedman and Tanner 2003; and Weiner 1992, 1993), Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Salehyan (2008, 2009) were the first to systematically evaluate the potentially negative effects of displacement, arguing that refugees often present problems for the states in which they are received. The spread of refugees can expand rebel social networks across borders and facilitate the spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies that promote conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2008, 2009). Additionally, refugee flows can alter the ethnic composition in areas in which they settle,

disrupting power relations between preexisting ethnic or cultural groups (Salehyan 2009). Finally, the existence of large numbers of refugees can exacerbate economic competition, as forced migrants may seek jobs or state resources in their new location that might otherwise have gone to individuals native to the area (Salehyan 2009). As a consequence, the existence of cross-border migration flows can contribute to the outbreak of civil war in the receiving country or a militarized inter-state dispute (MID) between the sending and receiving countries (Gleditsch and Salehyan 2006; Salehyan 2008). Despite the evidence that forced migrant populations can spread conflicts across borders, scholars have to this point neglected the possibility that similar processes might occur at the domestic level.

It is important here to clarify the intent of this section of the dissertation. Given the range of current public discourse regarding migrant populations and some of the extant literature on the subject, I find it necessary to state that I whole-heartedly reject the image of forced migrants as some sort of “infection” spreading instability to previously peaceful areas. As a scholar and an individual, I find this viewpoint unsettling from both a normative and practical standpoint. Normatively, I feel that countries rejecting forced migrants or subjecting them to undue burdens such as temporary internment adds to the victimization of civilians who have already become unfortunate victims of violence in their home countries. From a practical standpoint, I hope to point out that the desperation caused by forced migration can lead to significant security dilemmas *regardless* of whether those populations are allowed to migrate to neighboring countries. The problems that arise as a result of forced migration are not due to the existence of forced migrants themselves, but rather due to the lack of adequate care and resettlement of civilians who find themselves in a desperate and precarious position. Personally, my greatest fear is that this dissertation might be utilized by those who would twist its conclusions to justify the further stigmatization of forced migrant populations. Instead, I hope that this project serves as a clarion call for the protection of forced migrants, no matter their eventual destination.

Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence to support the notion that, when properly cared for, forced migrants can have a large positive effect on the areas in which they resettle. For example, a recent World Bank report found that a 1 percent increase in Syrian refugees led to a 1.5% increase in Lebanese service exports (World Bank, 2015a). Moreover, the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey has led to an increase in formal non-agricultural jobs and an increase in mean wages for Turkish workers (World Bank, 2015b). Finally, the influx of migrants into more developed countries can be a boon for countries where the demand for low-skill labor is high, but the attractiveness of those jobs to native citizens is comparatively low (Clemens and Pritchett, 2013). Regardless of the level of development of the receiving country, one of the primary factors determining whether an influx of forced migrants is a net positive or negative seems to be the degree to which these populations receive proper treatment and opportunity. Again, my hope is not to provide an excuse to reject forced migrant populations, but rather to highlight the need to extend the norm of refugee protection to those who are unable or unwilling to cross an international border in response to their victimization.

In this dissertation, I develop a model of displacement that takes into account the disparate motivations presented to state and non-state belligerents as regards displacement as well as the incentives presented to forced migrants regarding their eventual relocation. As such, non-state actors face a particular incentive to engage in the displacement of civilians as a method of consolidating territorial control. Moreover, non-state actors have a particular incentive to do so given that the short-term benefits of territorial control (namely: viability) outweigh the long-term disincentives of civilian victimization. While this arrangement leads non-state actors to engage in displacement as an intentional strategy, the long-term incentives presented to states typically prevent them from engaging in such a strategy. I also argue that the actors responsible for displacement have an effect on the eventual choice of destination for forced migrants. Given that those displaced by non-state

actors can find safety by relocating into other areas of the state (thus lowering the costs of migration), migrants displaced by non-state actors will be more likely to become internally displaced persons.

Finally, I show that wide-scale internal displacement can have negative effects on civil conflicts themselves. As in other research regarding forced migration (Gleditsch and Salehyan 2006; Salehyan 2008, 2009), I propose that forced migrants can facilitate the spread of grievance, arms, and ideology, leading to the spread of conflict into areas in which they resettle. Whereas these previous studies have focused on the effects of refugees migrating across borders, I propose here that internally displaced persons can lead to the spread of conflict *within a country*, thereby leading to an increase in conflict intensity (as measured by battle deaths) as well as conflict duration.

I begin the dissertation by discussing extant scholarship and some key terms. In Chapter 2, I develop a theory of internal displacement that expands upon the above theoretical implications. This chapter enumerates and describes the various elements at play within the theory, outlining the microfoundations behind concepts such as civilians' expectations of victimization and identifiability, and how these factors interrelate to shape the choice structures of potential migrants. This chapter also explains in detail the importance of information and how its availability (or lack thereof) can influence the decision to migrate. Additionally, the second chapter contains the theoretical explanation for my hypotheses regarding the effects of internal displacement, explaining in detail the process through which an influx of forced migrants can influence the conflict at the national level.

Chapters 3 and 4 consist of the empirical tests of my hypotheses regarding the generation of displaced persons. The third chapter presents a cross-national investigation (utilizing all civil conflicts from 1989-2008), while the fourth contains a sub-national analysis of displacement during the Colombian Civil War from 1998-2006. For the most part, I find evidence to support the

contention that internal displacement is the result of non-state belligerent actors attempting to secure and consolidate control over specific portions of territory.

In Chapter 5, I utilize a cross-national data set of all civil conflicts from 1989-2008 to investigate the degree to which internal displacement leads to an increase in battle deaths as well as conflict duration. Utilizing a number of estimation techniques including proportional hazard models, I show that internal displacement does indeed lead to an increase in conflict duration as well as an increase in overall battle deaths.

In Chapter 6, the conclusion, I discuss avenues for further research as well as some of the potential policy implications. While this project presents one of the more thorough studies of internal displacement to date, the lack of more fine-grained data on displacement allows for a great deal of further research to investigate the degree to which these results hold at the sub-national (or individual) level. Taken as a whole, this dissertation presents clear policy implications as regards conflict intervention: Given the potential effects of forced migration, this project underlines the practical need to care for migrant populations so as to avoid some of the potentially negative effects of displacement. Moreover, the more nuanced picture of displacement at the sub-national level could give practitioners a better idea of how displacement might unfold in real-time, improving humanitarian efforts by allowing practitioners to better predict forced migration flows.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEORY OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: CAUSES AND EFFECTS

“I don’t think people get displaced out of fear, but out of concern that they might die for something they didn’t want. You don’t want to die in a war that you don’t support, and if they come looking for you or threatening you, it’s better not to let yourself be killed if you don’t agree with it. I’ve asked lots of friends whether when you’re displaced, you’re cowardly or brave, and some say that we’re cowards because we fled. I say that we’re not cowards, because by fleeing we’re trying to preserve life, not your own life, but your family, your children who don’t know anything about what’s going on or why. You have to look after them. People are displaced simply so that they can protect their families. And if it’s a question of protecting your family, it doesn’t matter losing everything that you’ve worked for in life.” (IDMC, 2007; 127)

My theory of internal displacement during civil war³ builds from micro-level assumptions about forced migration in order to present testable hypotheses at both the local and national levels. I conceptualize internal displacement as the result of an interaction between two groups: Violent belligerents and civilians (the potentially displaced). Belligerents⁴ pose a threat (either through physical violence or intimidation) and civilians decide whether or not to flee the area in response. Within this general framework, a multitude of factors influence the decision-making process for both sides, shaping the character of internal displacement as a whole. By exploring the causes and consequences of internal displacement from both sides of the equation, my theory of displacement provides answers to four general questions about internal displacement during civil war: First, what causes internal displacement? Second, what determines the eventual destination of forced migrants? Third, what are the effects of IDPs on the communities in which they eventually relocate? Finally, how does the phenomenon of internal displacement affect the outcome and duration of civil wars? Below, I proceed to describe my theory in detail.

³ As discussed by Sambanis (2004) and others, the concept of “civil war” can be notoriously difficult to define. For practical purposes, I rely on the loose definition provided by Small and Singer (1982) and conceptualize civil wars as armed conflicts between the national government and organized non-state actors, occurring within the sovereign territory of the national government. To avoid over-repetition, I use “civil war” and “civil conflict” interchangeably.

⁴ For the purposes of this paper, “belligerent” can be taken to mean any group of individuals actively engaged in combat within the context of a civil war. To avoid over-repetition, I use “belligerent” and “armed group” interchangeably.

In short, my theory proposes that internal displacement arises largely as a result of territorial gains made by non-state actors. This occurs for two reasons: First, forced migrants' eventual destinations are influenced in part by the affiliation of the group responsible for their displacement. While migrants fleeing dissident violence may be able to escape extant threats to their personal security by moving to another region within the state (ostensibly cheaper than crossing an international border), migrants forced to flee due to government violence are often unable to escape persecution within the bounds of the state itself. Therefore, those displaced via government-perpetrated violence are more likely than those fleeing violence perpetrated by non-state actors to seek asylum abroad. As a result, displacement perpetrated by non-state actors is more likely to produce IDPs whereas those forced to flee by government actors are more likely to flee the state entirely and become refugees.

Moreover, non-state actors have an extra incentive to encourage the forced displacement of civilians residing in areas under their control. As shown by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Saleyhan (2009), non-state actors who manage to exert control over discrete portions of territory are far more successful in terms of winning the war or exacting concessions from the government. As shown by Steele (2009; 2011), non-state actors who force their ideological enemies (perceived or real) to relocate are able to change the ideological character of the population residing in areas under their control. In sum, territorial control is particularly important to non-state actors seeking to maintain viability as a challenger to the state, and inducing forced displacement is an effective tool with which to establish territorial control. While the state may seek to engage in similar actions, the victims of state-induced displacement are unlikely to become IDPs, as they often must leave the state entirely to find safety.

Additionally, I argue that the state is less likely to systematically engage in inducing displacement. While non-state actors may be content to solidify their hold over one or another

portion of territory, states aspire to exert control over the entire territory of the state. As such, states must consider the effects of the strategies used to gain territorial control and whether those strategies comport with overall war goals. While internal displacement may be effective in terms of solidifying control over a single territory, the process creates ideological enemies that relocate throughout the territory of the state. Therefore, states will be less likely to engage in the systematic displacement of civilians residing in territories under their control simply because the ramifications of such a strategy cut against the state's overall war goals.⁵

Secondly, I investigate the degree to which ethnic or cultural diversity can affect aggregate levels of displacement. While other scholars have found no link between ethnic conflicts and higher levels of forced migration (Schmeidl 1997; Moore and Shellman 2004; Melander and Öberg 2006; 2007), I posit that ethnic or cultural diversity can serve as an information transmission mechanism regarding civilian loyalties. As Kalyvas (2006) observed, armed groups attempt to solidify their hold on territory by committing violent acts against those who may have an affinity for the other side of a conflict. Their ability to do so is dependent on the degree to which belligerents can ascertain civilian loyalties. Steele (2009; 2011) applies this dynamic to internal displacement, demonstrating how election results can serve as a mechanism for revealing civilian loyalties at the village level. In this way, villages that electorally support the other side in a conflict become targets of violence by belligerents, forcing those who survive to flee in order to escape victimization. I propose that ethnic or cultural diversity can serve a similar role in revealing civilian loyalties in a conflict, and thus have an influence on aggregate levels of displacement, *regardless of whether the conflict is overtly ethnic in nature.*

⁵ Exceptions can be made for territories of particular importance. If the territory in question supplies a particularly scarce resource or is of particular strategic value, displacement may become an attractive strategy for states. Likewise, irredentist or secessionist conflicts may be more likely to incentivize state actors to engage in displacement (Kaufmann 1996). Nevertheless, in the aggregate, states are still *less likely* than non-state actors to induce displacement.

Lastly, I propose that the presence of large numbers of internally displaced persons can influence civil conflicts in several negative ways. Civil conflicts rarely affect the entire territory of the states in which they occur; more often they are characterized by intense fighting in one or another region of the state while other portions of the state are relatively peaceful. Because of the potentially negative effects of forced migrants on the areas in which they settle, internal displacement may be responsible for the geographic spread of conflict *within* countries, just as the flight of refugees can spread conflict between countries.

Similar to the work regarding refugees presented by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Salehyan (2008), I posit that the existence of large numbers of IDPs can exacerbate conflicts by facilitating the spread of arms and ideology from conflict-affected areas in the state to relatively peaceful ones. Additionally, the dispersion of IDPs from conflict-affected areas of the state can expand dissident social networks, increasing their penetration of the society's social structure. IDPs can also disrupt the balance of power between pre-existing groups in the areas in which they settle and increase economic and political competition, generating the possibility for further conflict.

IDPs can also have significant effects on power dynamics between belligerent groups. IDPs place stress upon government resources, thereby contributing to a balancing of capabilities between government and dissident actors. Secondly, the arrival of IDPs into areas hitherto untouched by conflict can have significant effects on existing economic and social structures by throwing previous equilibria out of balance and increasing competition for scarce resources such as jobs, food, or living space. Below, I expand on each one of these points in turn, explaining my theories on internal displacement in detail.

The Decision to Leave

"Then the paramilitaries gathered the fathers of the families [in the village] and gave them a 15-day deadline to leave town, 'and if you haven't left, you already know that we will [cut off] your head!'"
(IDMC, 2007; 87)

At the micro-level, my theory borrows generously from previous scholars who have applied Harris and Todaro's (1970) basic model of migration to the phenomenon of forced migration (Schmeidl 1997; Morrison & May, 1994; Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007; Steele 2009, 2011, 2013). Likewise, I build from individual-level assumptions about forced migration in order to identify macro-level implications about displacement during civil wars. Forced migration is a two-step process. Individuals are first forced to leave their homes; upon leaving, individuals must then decide where to go. While these two discussions are interrelated, I will discuss each of them in turn before moving on to a more thorough discussion of my theory.

First, I propose that potentially displaced persons weigh the expected values of remaining in a conflict-affected area against the potential costs and benefits of relocation. I define the expected value of remaining in a conflict area as a function of the economic and psycho-social benefits of remaining home, tempered by an individual's expectation of being victimized. Likewise, I define the expected value of fleeing a conflict zone as a function of the economic and psycho-social costs of moving, the expectation of being victimized elsewhere, and the economic and social opportunities available elsewhere. When the expected value of leaving outweighs the expected value of staying (largely determined by an individual's expectation of being victimized), individuals choose to migrate.

The first decision faced by potential migrants is "whether to remain in their homes, in (varying degrees of) possession of their land and material wealth, or to abandon these in favor of an uncertain life elsewhere." (Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003; 31). I theorize that individuals' expectations of being victimized are the crucial determinant of whether they decide to stay or leave in the face of a threat. Migration is costly, especially in the midst of a civil conflict. Numerous studies have outlined the myriad threats to health, wealth and livelihood associated with forced

migration (e.g., ICG 2005; PHR 2005; Ibáñez and Querubin, 2003). As such, the general expectation is that most individuals will remain in their homes when possible. Given these strong incentives to stay put, I expect that potential migrants will only leave when presented with grave threats to their personal security. In line with the international legal regime on forced migration, I fold these threats under the collective umbrella of “expectation of being victimized,” which I define as an individual’s relative probability of becoming a victim of violence given that he/she remains in a given area. As mentioned previously, this basic model of displacement is very similar to those used elsewhere in the literature. However, I utilize it to reveal some interesting and perhaps counter-intuitive findings about the characteristics that influence aggregate levels of displacement that have hitherto been missed.

As noted above, individuals’ expectations of being victimized are the crucial factor influencing their decision whether to stay or leave in the face of threats to their personal security.

Building on previous theories of forced migration, I propose that an individual’s expectation of victimization is a product of three elements: First, individuals must consider their relationship to the belligerent currently in control of the area they inhabit. If they share an affinity to the group, they may not feel as if they will be targets of violence, even if the belligerent in question is carrying out acts of violence. However, enemies (real




Figure 2: Formation of Civilians' Expectations of Victimization

or perceived) of the area's dominant belligerent will have more to fear if said belligerent decides to turn to violence.

The second factor influencing individuals' expectations of victimization is the degree to which the area's dominant belligerent carries a reputation for violent behavior. Perceived enemies of the area's dominant belligerent may not be motivated to leave by simple discrimination or acrimony. However, if the area's dominant belligerent is currently committing or is known to have committed violent acts against civilians, potential migrants will be more likely to expect that they may be targeted for similar acts. I assume that individuals form their expectations regarding the violent nature of belligerents by drawing from a common information set, available to all individuals involved in a conflict and comprised of news reports and word-of-mouth.

Lastly, individuals' expectations of victimization are influenced by what I call "identifiability," or the degree to which an individual's support for one side or another can be ascertained (or ascribed) by those who would do them harm. Individuals who might fear victimization based on the first two factors may be able to escape the hardships of migration by simply keeping their head down and attempting to blend in. Short of an information transmission mechanism that can identify perceived enemies, belligerents are unable to utilize selective violence against civilians residing in their territory.

Steele (2011) investigates this dynamic through the use of election returns, positing that these results serve as an information transmission mechanism for belligerent groups. When belligerents can "collectively target" their perceived enemies based on a shared characteristic, individuals fitting that description are more likely to leave their homes and seek safety elsewhere. In Steele's (2009, 2011) theory, belligerents use the results of elections to uncover civilian affinities at the village level, subsequently targeting for violence villages that voted against their interests, thereby inducing displacement. The use of census data and election results in Steele's (2011) study is a

laudably creative effort to track displacement and civilian loyalties. However, electoral results are but one possible avenue through which belligerent groups can ascertain civilian loyalties.

Belligerent groups in civil conflicts often define their support base on the basis of cultural, religious, or ethnic divisions in society. When those divisions are easily observable, they can have a stark influence on the level of threat presented to potential migrants. For example, an ethnic Serb during the Bosnian war might not be compelled to leave by the existence of a Serbian military group in his or her area, while a Bosniak would be far more likely to leave in response to the presence of the same group.

This is also a form of “collective targeting,” but instead of identifying victims based on village-level election returns, belligerents can target civilians who fit a particular ethnic or cultural profile. This dynamic may persist even if the conflict in question does not fit the profile of an “ethnic conflict.”⁶ Even if the conflict stems from factors other than ethnic or cultural divisions, certain ethnic or cultural groups may align with one side or the other in conflict, at least in the aggregate. When this happens, membership in that cultural or ethnic group becomes a signal of civilian allegiance, thereby providing belligerent groups with a mechanism to identify potential enemies, both real and perceived.

Systematic Displacement as a War-Time Strategy

“So the paramilitaries would say that the owner of the house was a collaborator, a guerilla, and that if he didn’t flee, he would be killed and his house burned down. And if he had animals, they would take them away and then use tractors to loot anything of use to them. The crops were left in their possession. Then they would bring in people to live on the plots... The people that they put there were allies, cachacos [persons from the interior of Colombia] brought from the outside...” (IDMC, 2007; 86-7)

⁶ Scholars have some disagreements about the definition of “ethnic conflict,” but here it is used simply to mean that the goals or membership of one or more groups involved in the conflict are/is based on ethnic or cultural divisions present within the society in question.

As mentioned previously, I argue that internal displacement happens as belligerents (particularly non-state actors) attempt to exert control over specific pieces of territory. Territorial control is almost a necessary condition for armed groups to become credible contenders for state power, as other studies have shown (Cunningham, Gleditsch, Salehyan 2009). While others have identified targeted violence as a means to accomplish this objective, it is assumed that the objective is simply to perpetrate violence against those who oppose the area's dominant belligerent. However, violence that leads to the large-scale displacement of potential dissidents may be an even more effective method of solidifying long-lasting ideological control over territories in dispute. With the exception of Steele (2009, 2011, 2013) past theories of violence against civilians have examined the conditions that give rise to displacement without considering that displacement itself can be the outcome of rational calculations made by belligerents. While some have argued that violence against civilians can be an effective means to achieve various war aims, initiating displacement based on ideological, ethnic, or other cleavages can be an even cheaper and more effective way to gain control over territory for the long haul.

Kalyvas' (1999) work on massacres in Algeria showed that violence against civilians is rational, positing that violence against civilians in civil wars is most effective (from the perspective of perpetrating groups) when it maximizes civilian support and deters their defection. This theory was further developed by Kalyvas' (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, which disaggregated violence against civilians into two types: selective violence, or violence aimed at specific individuals and intended to punish defection; and indiscriminate violence, or violence intended to target all civilians within an area indiscriminately. Groups which exercise less than total control over their territory engage in selective violence in an attempt to "shore up" control, while groups attempting to induce instability into the territories which are partially (but not fully) controlled by the enemy engage in indiscriminate violence.

To Kalyvas (2006), targeted violence is a means to an end; by targeting civilians who defect (either by removing their support or supporting another side in the conflict), armed groups compel the rest of the population's support. However, Kalyvas makes a key assumption about the ability of some civilians to switch allegiances during conflict: Since civilians value their lives above all else, "most civilians will respond by cooperating with the political actor who makes the most credible threats" (Kalyvas 1999). To the extent that this is possible, it is most likely true. But what of those unlucky civilians who, for reasons of ethnicity, religion, cultural or socioeconomic status, or simply a strong commitment to their ideals, are unable or unwilling to pledge their allegiance to the side exerting control in their area? Such individuals would most likely leave the area if they do, as Kalyvas assumes, value their lives above all else.

Steele (2011, 2013) showed that displacement can be a desirable outcome on the part of belligerents.⁷ Belligerents court the allegiance of civilians through the provision of both benefits and sanctions. Violence against civilians is thus a strategy through which belligerents are able to consolidate support in territories under incomplete control. However, displacement is both cheaper and more effective as a strategy to consolidate territorial control. Why expend resources gathering information and carrying out an extended campaign of selective violence to rid the area of potential subversives when those individuals can simply be encouraged to relocate?

Often, belligerents are able to forgo targeting individuals and simply issue a general order that civilians fitting a specific profile must leave or be targeted for violence. Both guerillas and paramilitaries in Colombia have taken to posting *listas de limpieza*⁸ (cleaning lists) upon entering a new town. These lists identify specific individuals as well as detail specific general characteristics which mark civilians as targets for violence if they do not leave the area within a prescribed period of time.

⁷ Steele (2011) applies this logic mainly to counter-insurgents, with the caveat that, "in some cases, insurgents defending against encroachment may resort to displacement." By contrast, I contend that all non-state actors face these incentives to displace as a strategy of consolidation.

⁸ A translated example of one of these lists is provided in Appendix B.

To drive the threat home, these lists often come with a warning regarding the inevitability of victimization. One example reads: “Now is the time for social cleansing... The entire stack of you [“thieves”] will be caught. Trial or death; you decide. We have a list [of individuals] from our initial sweep.” (AUC, 2009)

By targeting general characteristics as well as specific individuals, belligerents are able to accomplish the goal of consolidating territorial control without suffering the costs of monitoring and gathering specific information on specific individuals. Displacement also brings the long-term benefit of creating a region of ideological solidarity through the forced migration of dissidents, changing the ideological character of regions under their control. Moreover, resources can be appropriated from individuals who are forced to migrate, thereby increasing the relative power of the actor who induced displacement.

Leaving one’s home is a severe reaction to pressures from political actors. Intuitively we can assume that civilians do not simply leave their lives behind and become displaced in response to polite requests or empty threats. Absent a credible threat to their personal security, potential migrants might simply stay in their homes. As such, violence against civilians is a necessary condition for inducing displacement, but not the cause in and of itself.

In this theory, belligerents still target civilians with violence to “punish defection” (Kalyvas, 2006), but this is only half of the story. Here, targeted violence is used as a mechanism for inducing displacement among those individuals within contested territory who, for whatever reason, are unable or unwilling to switch their allegiances to the dominant belligerent in their area. We can thus conceive of targeted violence against civilians as a mechanism for establishing a credible threat and thereby induce displacement.

The Choice of Destination

As mentioned earlier, individuals choose to migrate when the expected value of leaving outweighs the expected value of staying. Moreover, I assume that forced migrants will move to the best possible place for the lowest possible cost. By “best possible place,” I mean that migrants will seek to relocate to areas that allow them to minimize extant threats to their personal security, while at the same time allowing them to maximize their economic and psycho-social welfare. By “lowest possible cost,” I am acknowledging the fact that forced migrants find their abilities to relocate to a safer location constrained by their available resources. For simplification, I assume that the costs of resettlement increase with distance; the further one must go in order to find safety, the more expensive the trip will be. I expand on each of these elements below.

In the context of civil conflict, individuals forced to migrate from their homes do so in order to escape threats to their personal security. Since threats to their personal security stem from the process in which they were originally displaced, forced migrants must consider belligerents’ respective areas of control when choosing their destination. The key to this logic is the concept of territorial control, and how it affects civilians’ expectations of being victimized. Civil conflicts often involve threats to personal security, but these threats only apply to those areas in which the actors perpetrating them can project force. While belligerents can engage in speculative “hit-and-run” attacks into segments of territory unowned by them (Kalyvas, 2006), they are unlikely to be able to present a sustained level of threat to civilians residing in those territories. Accordingly, forced migrants will, when possible, attempt to escape the area controlled by the armed group responsible for forcing them from their homes.

As mentioned above, migrants’ abilities to relocate to their most preferred destination are constrained by their available resources. While some migrants may possess more personal wealth than others, most available research regarding forced migrants’ economic conditions stresses the

degree to which the process of displacement often strips many migrants of what little wealth they may have possessed prior to leaving their homes (Ibáñez 2004; Erazo et al 1999; Ibáñez and Querubin, 2003). Moreover, migration is a costly enterprise, especially during a civil conflict (ICG, 2005; PHR, 2005), and as such, individuals' abilities to migrate to a safer area are constrained greatly by a lack of material resources to do so. When combined with the assumption that the costs of migration increase with distance traveled, the above implies that when individuals are able to escape extant threats to their personal security by traveling within the borders of their home state, they will choose to do so rather than stomach the increased costs of migrating abroad and crossing international borders.

Given the above, I propose that the source of violence that originally caused displacement is the crucial determinant of whether an individual forced migrant becomes an IDP or a refugee. Recall that individuals forced to migrate from their homes will relocate to the safest possible area for the lowest possible cost. Individuals who find themselves persecuted by the state are more likely to leave the country and become refugees, since it is difficult to escape the state's reach without leaving the country itself. For individuals targeted by non-state actors, relocation to domestic urban environments (ostensibly cheaper than leaving the country entirely) can provide sanctuary for forced migrants due to increased job opportunities, larger social networks, and (generally) increased security from non-state actors, since many civil conflicts tend to be concentrated in rural areas and the goal of non-state actors here is to drive away political opponents, not necessarily to eliminate them. However, urban areas do not offer the same degree of protection to migrants who find themselves persecuted by the state. In fact, movement to an urban area or humanitarian encampment within the state can actually increase these individuals' expectations of being victimized, as the state is more likely to have firm control over (and consistent access to) these areas, and thus more likely to

identify and target them as enemies to the regime. For those persecuted by the state, the only truly safe harbor is a foreign one.

This is not to say, however, that states do not engage in violent actions towards civilians, nor that they are not the cause of displacement generally. As with other belligerents, states often use many forms of violence to target civilians they perceive to be opponents. States are often the largest perpetrator of violence against civilians, especially in the case of insurgencies. It is not the intent of this dissertation to assert that states are guilt-free when it comes to the victimization of civilians, only that states are very rarely incentivized to engage in the intentional displacement of civilians to other parts of the country. That said, government violence may, in some cases, incentivize civilians to become internally displaced. When states acquire a reputation for victimizing civilians residing in areas controlled by non-state actors, civilians may feel the need to relocate in order to escape government retribution. For example, the Dos Erres massacre in Guatemala occurred when government forces, finding themselves unable to locate Marxist guerillas in the town of Dos Erres, began to ruthlessly murder the civilians of the village. Likewise, the infamous My Lai massacre committed by American troops in Vietnam occurred because civilians residing in the hamlet of My Lai were asserted to have been guerilla sympathizers, and therefore were ruthlessly targeted for violence.

Given the tendency of states engaging in violence against civilians as a counter-insurgency strategy, civilians may feel the need to leave their homes when non-state actors become active in their area. In this way, civilians may hope to declare their allegiance for the state by fleeing areas controlled by non-state actors, thus avoiding potential retributive violence. While this is a slightly different theoretical mechanism for inducing displacement, the results would likely be the same from the outside: Non-state actors seek to control distinct portions of territory, and civilians who either feel more loyalty to the state or who do not trust the non-state actor to protect them may feel the

need to flee in order to find safety. Regardless, the expectation is that internal displacement will occur in areas where non-state actors consolidate territorial gains.

The Effects of Internal Displacement

'I've never felt discriminated against because I've never told anyone at the schools I've been to that I was displaced. Because when I started school, they started talking about displacement and they said that displaced people were thieves... From that day, I told myself that I'd never say that I'd been displaced... Wherever you go, if they find out that you're a displaced person, they don't treat you as kindly as they do others. (IDMC 2007; 105-106)

As alluded to previously, the influx of large numbers of IDPs is likely to have negative repercussions upon the communities in which they relocated. As has been noted in previous migration studies, the sudden arrival of large numbers of migrants can lead to increased levels of economic and political competition (Olzak 1992). At the local level, this increased competition can lead to increases of political grievances and unemployment, increases in the prices of food and housing, and the depression of wages. At the national level, the aggregation of the effects of internal displacement can exert force on the duration and intensity of civil wars themselves, affecting the balance of power between belligerents and forestalling the resolution of conflict. I go into further detail on each of these points below.

As identified in Gleditsch and Salehyan (2006) as well as Salehyan (2008), the resettlement of displaced populations can have negative consequences upon the places to which they relocate. Migrant populations can facilitate the spread of arms and conflictual ideology, as well as expand (at least geographically) the social networks of belligerents. Additionally, migrants can upset local power balances and induce economic competition (Olzak 1992). Often willing to work for near-subsistence wages due to their dire economic condition, the sudden influx of IDPs into relatively peaceful areas can result in heightened economic competition for low-wage labor. Having been priced out of previously stable employment, grievances may increase among natives in the lower-income strata of regions experiencing an influx of IDPs. Moreover, a large population of resettled IDPs can upset

local power balances by introducing an entirely new constituency to an area, one which can be courted by local power brokers in order to bypass “native” demands. This dynamic can introduce new levels of grievance among populations in previously peaceful areas, thus increasing the probability that conflict could spread to these new areas.

More than just causing a negative reaction among the locals in the communities to which they resettle, IDPs can affect the relative capabilities of the belligerents involved. First, large numbers of IDPs can stress the resource base of governments attempting to care for them, thus decreasing the available resources for governments to use in the fight against rebel populations. Without making such assistance available, governments risk burning political capital to assuage the grievances of local populations beset by an influx of IDPs. Either way, large-scale internal displacement imposes costs on the state and affects its strength vis-à-vis its opponent(s) in civil conflict.

Additionally, the precarious economic situation (and potential for further victimization) faced by IDPs may encourage them to become fighters themselves. As Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) identified, membership within an armed group provides tangible benefits, often including income, safety, and personal agency. This increases the probability of civilians facing the potential for victimization to join armed groups in order to protect themselves. Given their perilous situation (and potential to be motivated by revenge), IDPs are prime candidates for recruitment into armed groups. There is some evidence to show that IDPs constitute a significant percentage of the combatants in armed groups. As per a survey of demobilized Colombian fighters conducted in 2005 (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2007), nearly 30% of all combatants (across all groups) were either former IDPs or related to an IDP.

Given the above, I posit that the presence of large numbers of IDPs can lead to an increase in poverty, hunger, criminal activity, and recruitment for armed groups, thereby exacerbating the

civil war already in progress. In this way, the phenomenon of internal displacement is more than just an unfortunate side-effect of civil conflicts, but rather a cycle that lends fuel to the fire of civil conflict by weakening the state and strengthening non-state actors. As such, I expect that civil conflicts that produce large amounts of internal displacement will be longer and more brutal (in terms of the overall death toll).

CHAPTER THREE

A CROSS-NATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSES OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

The theory presented in the previous chapter presents testable implications at both the national and sub-national levels, and I address these implications in turn. For this chapter, I focus on the effects of internal displacement at the national level and attempt to provide an answer to one of the motivating questions of this project: Why do some civil conflicts produce more internally displaced persons (IDPs) than others, given similar levels of violence? In the previous chapter, I propose that the source of violence is the crucial determinant of whether an individual becomes an IDP or a refugee. Accordingly, the degree to which any given civil conflict produces more or fewer IDPs depends largely on violence perpetrated by dissident actors, since migrants who find themselves targeted by government actors will likely leave the state and become refugees so as to avoid persecution.

In this chapter, I provide some preliminary evidence to support my theories regarding the causes of displacement during civil conflict. Utilizing a cross-national data set of all civil conflicts⁹ from 1989-2008, I show that the incidence of internal displacement itself is associated with territorial control by dissident groups. Moreover, the scale of internal displacement is modified by levels of dissident violence against civilians, while levels of state violence against civilians have little to no relationship with overall levels of internal displacement. Finally, the results presented in this chapter give evidence to support the notion that ethnic or cultural heterogeneity has a positive association with aggregate levels of internal displacement.

⁹ Defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as 25 or more battle deaths in a given year.

Theory and Hypotheses

As mentioned previously, this analysis of internal displacement improves on previous research in two ways: First, I introduce the notion of territorial control as a necessary condition for non-state actors to induce wide-scale internal displacement during civil wars. Secondly, I distinguish between sources of violence in an attempt to investigate how violence from state and dissident actors each contribute to overall levels of internal displacement. Finally, I introduce the concept of “identifiability” to investigate the degree to which ethnic or cultural heterogeneity can influence internal displacement.

To elaborate, recall that the theory presented in Chapter Two asserts that individuals forced to migrate from their homes will relocate to the safest possible area for the lowest possible cost. While those persecuted by the state are likely to vacate the country entirely in order to find sanctuary from their oppressor, individuals persecuted by non-state actors are able to relocate within other areas of the state (particularly urban areas) to find safety. Thus, we would expect to see internal displacement to occur in areas where dissident actors threaten civilian populations into abandoning their homes. This logic leads to two separate testable implications: First, large-scale internal displacement should only occur during civil conflicts in which non-state actors control discrete portions of territory. Second, the scale of internal displacement should increase along with overall levels of violence from non-state actors. I deal with each of these implications in turn.

Regarding the conditional effect of territorial control on internal displacement, recall from the earlier discussion of civilians’ expectations of victimization that potential migrants must consider which of the existing belligerents currently controls the area they inhabit. Civil conflicts often involve threats to personal security, but these threats only apply to areas in which the relevant belligerents can project force. While forced migration can occur in the context of almost any violence perpetrated by government actors, individuals who are displaced by government forces are

unlikely to relocate within the state. Dissident actors, on the other hand, must be able to take and hold specific portions of territory in order to present the kind of sustained threat necessary to induce displacement. Moreover, the needs of a war-time insurgency make displacement an attractive strategy for non-state groups. As such, whether internal displacement arises as a result of dissident violence or dissidents providing safe havens (the theory presented in Moore and Shellman 2006), both are unlikely without dissidents exhibiting direct control over territory. As such, I expect that dissident territorial control is a *necessary condition* for displacement on a comparatively large scale.

Territorial Control Hypothesis: Wars in which dissident actors control specific pieces of territory are more likely to produce internal displacement.

While territorial control by non-state actors can be an important predictor of the incidence of displacement, the theory presented in this project also concerns the scale of displacement once it occurs. As mentioned in Chapter One, existing scholarly literature has pointed to violence against civilians as one of the most important factors leading to forced migration. To disaggregate this relationship, I posit that internal displacement is largely the result of violence from non-state actors. Civilians' expectations of victimization increase with violence from belligerents generally, thus increasing their propensity to migrate. Civilians displaced by non-state actors, however, are more likely to relocate within the state while those victimized by the state must leave the country entirely to find safety. As such, I expect that higher levels of violence perpetrated by non-state actors will beget higher levels of internal displacement during civil wars.

Dissident Violence Hypothesis: Higher levels of violence by dissident actors will be associated with higher levels of internal displacement.

As stated during the previous chapter, the third factor influencing individuals' expectations of being victimized is what I call "identifiability," or the degree to which an individual's affinity for one or another belligerent can be ascertained (or ascribed) by belligerent groups.

Building upon Steele's (2009, 2011) work, belligerents can "collectively target" their perceived enemies based on a shared characteristic, rendering some civilians more likely to displace. While Steele's (2011) work utilized election returns as the primary transmission mechanism for information regarding civilian allegiances, I argue that identifiability can serve as an additional information source at the individual level: When ethnic or cultural groups can be associated with an affinity towards one or another group, civilians possessing those characteristics could find themselves at a higher risk of victimization. Given this increased risk, those civilians will be more likely to migrate at the individual level. At the aggregate level, I therefore expect that higher levels of ethnic or cultural heterogeneity should increase the potential for collective targeting and therefore lead to higher levels of displacement.

Identifiability Hypothesis: *Higher levels of ethnic diversity will be associated with higher levels of internal displacement in civil conflicts.*

Finally, while information regarding civilian loyalties represents one side of the information transmission dynamic, potential migrants also receive information regarding belligerents which affects their expectations of being victimized and thus, their decision to leave or stay. Recall from above that potential migrants must consider the degree to which the dominant belligerent in their area carries a reputation for violence. Less violent groups may still subject civilians to prolonged discrimination or other forms of maltreatment, but this alone may not be enough to compel civilians to abandon their homes and seek safety elsewhere. However, groups with a demonstrated propensity and/or reputation for violence will be more likely to induce displacement among the civilian populations under their control. As belligerent groups are revealed to be more or less violent over time, civilians update their beliefs regarding the probability that they themselves will become victims of violence.

The above leads to the relatively straightforward implication that more violence leads to more displacement; a notion which underpins Hypothesis Two in this chapter as well as a good deal of other research on forced migration. However, information about belligerent activities during civil conflicts rarely reveals itself in real time. Often, the data on wartime violence used by conflict researchers is gathered in post-conflict situations, where researchers and journalists are able to establish more accurate counts of wartime violence. That work is undertaken precisely because information sources during war are often inconsistent and incomplete at best. In addition, the incentives provided to many agents entrusted with delivering information regarding ongoing conflicts to the outside world ensure that much wartime data is intentionally biased in one or another form. In many ways, information during wartime is drawn from a poisoned well of misinformation, through which potential migrants must sort in order to update their beliefs about their potential for victimization.

Since this project is interested in the decisions made by migrants caught in the midst of civil conflict, it is inappropriate to assume that they are privy to real-time, unbiased information regarding belligerent activities. Even when information regarding the “true” nature of events manages to bubble to the surface, it does so slowly, requiring time to be effectively researched by journalists and researchers. Information spread via word-of-mouth likewise takes time to filter into the set of public knowledge. While I assume that individuals base their perceptions regarding belligerents’ capacity for violence on information garnered from the public information set, the veracity of this information set likely increases with time. As such, I expect that while higher levels of violence will indeed lead to higher levels of forced migration, but I also expect that this effect requires time to come to fruition as information about belligerent activities filters out into public knowledge. Accordingly, I theorize that groups’ past behavior will have a stronger effect on forced migration than their behavior in the current time period.

Information Lag Hypothesis: *Higher levels of violence at time (t-1) will be associated with higher levels of displacement at time t.*

Research Design

To investigate the above theories of internal displacement at the aggregate level, I utilize a data set composed of all civil conflicts active during the years 1989-2008, where civil conflicts are defined as “an incident (or incidents) of violence between states and insurgent groups which generates at least twenty-five casualties in a given year, involving an incompatibility over either government control or territorial autonomy.” (Eck and Hultman, 2007) The resulting dataset contains 506 country-years of civil conflict for 72 countries.

The dependent variable for this study is a measure of the number of internally displaced persons present in a given country at the end of a given year. This data is compiled in the Forcibly Displaced Persons dataset, which uses information from the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants’ *World Refugee Survey*, whose internal displacement counts were compiled with the assistance of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (USCRI 2008).

At a glance, perhaps the most notable thing about internal displacement counts across civil conflicts is that displacement is not as common as some might assume. Internal displacement is of course a widespread problem, but one which seems to affect certain types of civil conflicts. Nearly 30% of country-years in the data set produce zero values for displacement. This high frequency of zero values poses some methodological problems in that any analysis must first account for the high production of zero values. To use an analogy, imagine that we are analyzing the factors which led to the most fish caught among a community of campers. Before investigating the effects of the variables which influenced the number of total fish caught, we must first distinguish those who never went fishing (and thus caught zero fish) and those who fished unsuccessfully (also catching zero fish). Likewise, the analysis presented in this chapter must also account for the possible

systematic production of zeroes in the dependent variable. While this poses a methodological issue, it allows for a more flexible analysis in that I can examine the factors that influence the *incidence* of internal displacement as well as its scale. In their series of studies, Moore and Shellman (2004, 2006, 2008) utilize zero-inflated count models to address this issue, and I follow suit by utilizing a zero-inflated negative binomial model¹⁰.

This particular model is chosen because a negative binomial takes into account the non-normal distribution and overdispersion of the dependent variable. Ordinary least squares models are ruled out due to the fact that the Poisson distribution of count data violates the assumption of normality and can lead to biased estimates. Additionally, a zero-inflated model is used to compensate for the existence of any kind of systematic production of zero values. While giving us a more accurate picture of the variables which drive the scale of displacement, the zero-inflated model also provides an analysis of the variables which determine whether displacement occurs at all. In addition to providing negative binomial regression results, a zero-inflated model produces the results of a logit model (inflation equation) which analyzes the factors that influence the production of zeros in the dependent variable. Strong negative coefficients in an inflation equation correspond to variables which, when they exist, are unlikely to be associated with a zero in the dependent variable.

Independent Variables

The first hypothesis to be tested refers to the *incidence* of displacement rather than its scale. As mentioned previously, the Territorial Control hypothesis posits that conflicts in which non-state actors control discrete portions of territory will be more likely to experience internal displacement than conflicts in which non-state actors were unable to secure a hold on territory. This analysis is

¹⁰ See Moore and Shellman (2004; 733) for further discussion on negative binomial models in this context, as well as Zorn (1998) for a more in-depth discussion of zero-inflated negative binomials more generally.

made possible through the use of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression introduced above: In addition to providing negative binomial regression results, a zero-inflated model produces the results of a logit model (inflation equation) which analyzes the factors influencing the production of zeroes in the dependent variable. Within this logit model, I include a dichotomous variable from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset provided by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009), which indicates whether a dissident group clearly exercised some degree of control over a specific portion of territory within the conflict in a given year. Because I expect that dissident territorial control will be associated with the incidence of displacement, I expect a negative effect in the inflation (logit) model.

The Dissident Violence Hypothesis states that increase levels of dissident violence will be associated with increased levels of internal displacement. To test this, I utilize data from the One-Sided Violence (OSV) dataset provided by Eck and Hultman (2007) and maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The dataset records the total number of civilian deaths caused by a state or formally organized group in a given year. More importantly, the data is disaggregated by perpetrator, which allows me to empirically evaluate the Dissident Violence Hypothesis. To analyze the effect of violence perpetrated by each side, I use the log totals of one-sided violence from each side separately, producing indicators of the scale of both government and dissident violence. The Information Lag Hypothesis predicts that information regarding belligerent violence takes time to filter into the set of public knowledge. As such, I include indicators of violence from both sides at time ($t-1$) alongside indicators of violence at time (t). Taken together, I expect to see a positive association between dissident violence at time ($t-1$).

Finally, the Identifiability Hypothesis states that increased levels of ethnic or cultural heterogeneity can lead to higher aggregate levels of internal displacement. For this, I utilize the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization indices, compiled by Philip G. Roeder (2001), which measures

diversity as the probability (from 0-1) that two randomly selected individuals in a given country will belong to separate ethnic groups. For robustness, I also estimated the model using Fearon's (2003) measure of cultural fractionalization, which did not significantly alter the results. While this is a flawed measure for several reasons, reliable measures of ethnic diversity covering the time periods and countries in question are scarce. Notwithstanding these problems, the measure does give a broad picture of how cross-sectional variation in ethnic diversity can affect the scale of displacement.

Control Variables

I include a number of control variables to isolate the effects of the variables of interest. First among these is the log value of battle deaths in the conflict, as an indicator of the intensity of fighting. These figures are culled from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Eck and Hultman, 2007) and are coded as the log value of battle-related deaths between belligerents in a given year. Intuitively, and as produced elsewhere in the literature, more intense conflicts are expected to produce larger numbers of IDPs. I also control for the number of active dissident groups present in a country (as culled from the Non-State Actors dataset), and the number of years the conflict has been previously active.

Political institutions have also been shown to affect the scale of displacement (Davenport, Moore and Poe, 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004), and although that is not the focus of this study, each nation's yearly score from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2011) are included in the analysis¹¹. Wealth is similarly controlled for by including each

¹¹ Some readers may be concerned about the potential endogeneity of including Polity scores alongside other independent variables which may be correlated with democratic institutions. For robustness, alternate models were estimated without this variable, which did not substantially alter the results of the key variables of interest.

nation's yearly log value of GDP per capita. Land area and population (both logged) are also included in the count equation. In addition, I control for the percentage of a state's population living in rural areas with data from the World Bank, as Steele (2009) theorized that internal displacement is more likely in rural areas.

Finally, it is possible that the goals of conflicts may be related to the incidence of displacement. For example, dissidents fighting a secessionist conflict may seek to displace civilians so as to solidify their control over a specific portion of territory. By contrast, dissidents seeking to carry out a coup would be less likely to displace given the focus on capturing the head of state. In any case, I include dichotomous indicator variables for whether the conflict in question was ethnic in nature, a secessionist conflict, or a coup, as coded in the Non-State Actor data set (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009).

Results

The full results of the models used to test my hypotheses are contained in tables 1 and 2. Turning first to the logit model (inflation equation), I find strong support for the Territorial Control Hypothesis, as the coefficient for Dissident Territorial Control is negative and significant at ($p < .001$), indicating a strong association between dissident territorial control and non-zero counts of internal displacement. Additionally, I replicate the results from elsewhere in the literature stating that ethnic conflicts are not associated with the onset of internal displacement (Schmeidl 1997; Moore and Shellman 2004; Melander and Öberg 2006, 2007).

The results of the negative binomial regression are reported in Table 2. For ease of interpretation, I eschew traditional coefficients in favor of Incidence Rate Ratios (IRRs), which represent the change in internally displaced persons given a unit change in the independent variable, holding all others constant. Accordingly, an IRR of 1.0 indicates no change in the expected count of internally displaced persons, while an IRR below 1.0 indicates a decrease in the expected count of

internally displaced persons and an IRR above 1.0 represents an increase.

I find significant support for both the Dissident Violence Hypothesis as well as the

Table 1: Results, Logit Model (Incidence of Internal Displacement)

Covariate	Coefficient	Standard Error
Dissident Territorial Control	-0.710***	0.198
Secessionist Conflict	-0.286	0.198
Ethnic Conflict	0.324	0.395
Coup	-0.632	0.692
Dissident Violence (<i>t</i>)	-0.142**	0.065
Dissident Violence (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.098*	0.052
Government Violence (<i>t</i>)	-0.146**	0.067
Government Violence (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.034	0.08
Polity IV	-0.012	0.017
GDP/Capita	0.02	0.074
Conflict Years	-0.074***	0.02
Region	-0.23**	0.116

Information Lag Hypothesis. Across all of the lag specifications, dissident violence is positively associated with internal displacement, while government violence seems to be unrelated. Comparing the lag specifications indicates that while dissident violence always has some effect on internal displacement, the positive association is most strongly felt at (*t-1*). This effect was investigated using multiple lag specifications for robustness, but the effect of dissident violence seems to wear off after (*t-2*), and including further lags in the final model seemed unnecessarily cumbersome and did not

improve the overall fit of the model. However, the evidence presented here suggests that dissident violence is intricately tied to the scale of displacement during civil conflicts, and that this effect is strongest at ($t-1$).

The Identifiability Hypothesis receives support as well. The coefficient here should be

Table 2: Results, Negative Binomial Model (Scale of Internal Displacement)

Covariate	Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR)	Standard Error
Dissident Violence (t)	1.053***	0.02
Dissident Violence ($t-1$)	1.106***	0.022
Dissident Violence ($t-2$)	1.061***	0.022
Government Violence (t)	1.008	0.016
Government Violence ($t-1$)	1.031	0.019
Government Violence ($t-2$)	0.978	0.016
Ethnic Diversity	2.144***	0.385
Polity IV	0.927***	0.008
Battle Deaths	1.118***	0.027
Number of Active Belligerents	0.835***	0.022
Rural Population %	1.000	0.003
Total Population	1.166***	0.049
GDP	1.243***	0.079
Conflict Years	1.04***	0.007

N = 506, Non-Zero Observations: 341
* Indicates significance at 0.05 level in a two-tailed test.
** Indicates significance at 0.01 level in a two-tailed test.
*** Indicates significance at a .001 level in a two-tailed test.

ignored, since a unit change in the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization scale represents the difference between a perfectly homogenous society (every individual is of the same ethnicity/culture, or ELF=0) and a perfectly diverse one (every individual is of a different ethnicity/culture, or ELF=1). However, the positive and significant result is an indication that increased levels of ethnic or cultural heterogeneity can lead to increased levels of internal displacement during civil conflicts.

Conclusion

Taken as a whole, the evidence put forth in this chapter presents a unique and complex picture of displacement. The decision to migrate is a function of the threats presented to individuals, and the nature of those threats help to determine migrants' eventual destination. Accordingly, this chapter finds evidence to suggest that internal displacement is a function of the salience of threats posed by dissident actors to civilian populations. First, the incidence of internal displacement depends in part on the ability of dissident actors to control distinct portions of territory in order to present a credible threat to civilian populations. Second, the findings in this chapter also suggest that the effects of belligerent violence on forced migration take time to emerge, perhaps due to the poor quality of public information sources during wartime. Finally, this paper reinforced the general finding that ethnic conflicts are no more likely to produce internal displacement. Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that ethnically heterogeneous populations may be more susceptible to wide-scale internal displacement because fewer individuals are able to escape identification by those who might pose a threat to them.

CHAPTER FOUR

A SUB-NATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSES OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR

Testing theories about internal displacement poses a considerable challenge. While I have previously conducted a cross-national study of internal displacement across civil wars, I argue that internal displacement follows local-level dynamics of territorial control, violence, and demographic makeup. As such, a proper test of my theories' hypotheses regarding the production of IDPs requires a sub-national investigation. Colombia is an excellent case with which to test my theory, for a number of reasons. First, the ongoing (as of this writing) civil war in Colombia has produced one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons in the world. As of December 2013, its 5.7 million persons internally displaced as a result of conflict ranked Colombia at number 2 in the world, behind Syria (IDMC, 2016). Despite the ongoing conflict and the tragedy of massive internal displacement, Colombia is relatively accessible for researchers and (thanks to a number of NGOs) there is a good deal of data available both on acts of conflict as well as displacement.

Beyond these factors, the dynamics of the Colombian Civil War make it an excellent test case for my argument. I argue that non-state actors seeking control over territory are primarily responsible for internal displacement, *regardless of their ideology or alignment vis-à-vis the state*. Colombia's civil conflict is unique in that there exists a number of non-state actors who differ in terms of their ideology, strategic goals, and relationship with the state. These non-state actors include both dissidents (such as the FARC-EP, ELN and others) as well as pro-government militias (the most prominent being the AUC and its various sub-groups). While both can be classified as non-state actors, they differ greatly in terms of their membership, strategic goals, and tactics (Sanín, 2008). Despite these differences, I argue that both pro-government militias and dissidents intentionally and systematically engage in actions that lead to internal displacement. Below, I go into further detail on

the Colombian conflict and the actors involved, followed by my hypotheses, research design, and results.

Roots of the Conflict

“When the armed groups began to arrive, they also began to control people... They say everyone has to be involved in the war, that there are no preferences... As such, the armed groups will terrorize anyone and you have to collaborate with them, even if you don’t want to.”(IDMC, 2007; 85)

The beginning of the civil war in Colombia is normally dated to 1964 or 1966, depending on the source. Regardless, sources agree that the current civil war is rooted in the period known as *La Violencia*, an elite-based partisan conflict that claimed the lives of anywhere between 200,000-300,000 people between 1945 and 1965 (Rojas and Tubb, 2013; Sanchez and Bakewell, 1985). While *La Violencia* affected the country’s entire population, it was based in a partisan political conflict between two factions (Liberals and Conservatives) of Colombia’s oligarchic elites (Roldán, 2003) In response, peasant farmer organizations (often organized by the Colombian Communist party) began to organize into local militias meant to protect rural communities from the ongoing political violence and persecution of left-wing organizers (Molano, 2000).

Many of these local militias would eventually join together to create the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army, FARC-EP¹²) after the organization was officially formed in 1964. However, the disparate nature of the local militias that eventually created the FARC-EP has beset the organization with internal strife and frequent splintering throughout its history, resulting in a number of parallel guerilla groups that have, at times, opposed the FARC-EP itself (Molano, 2000).

¹² The “EP” tag was added in 1982, but is used throughout here for consistency.

The FARC-EP's High-Water Mark

Despite this internecine strife, the FARC-EP continued to exist as a low-intensity rural force until the 1980s, when increasing profits from the drug trade brought them closer to the Colombian state in terms of military capability. After the “Seventh Guerilla Conference” in 1982, the FARC-EP made a strategic shift towards targeting more urban and resource-rich areas and eventually forced political concessions in 1984, leading to the creation of the *Unión Patriótica* (Patriotic Union), a leftist political party. Beyond simply existing as a political arm of the FARC-EP, the UP enjoyed a broad base of support from leftist organizations, especially those in rural farming communities. After a strong showing in the elections of 1986, representatives and supporters of the UP were systematically victimized, resulting in an estimated 4,000-6,000 dead, including a number of presidential candidates from the UP and other leftist political parties (Molano, 2000). As a result, the ceasefire broke and the FARC-EP resumed its armed struggle.

The FARC-EP grew in both size and capability during the early 1990's. First, blowback from the widespread assassinations of UP members and sympathizers led to an increase in recruitment as more and more left-leaning civilians became convinced that peaceful change was impossible. Secondly, US-led anti-drug efforts eliminated competitors such as the Medellin and Cali gangs¹³, allowing for the expansion of FARC-EP narco-trafficking (Peceny and Durnan, 2006). Lastly, the end of the Cold War led the FARC-EP to rely more heavily on criminal activity to support themselves. The increased reliance on narco-trafficking led to an expansion into other criminal activities such as kidnapping, which (while harming overall civilian support) became increasingly profitable. With their newfound strength, the FARC-EP began to expand their territorial reach and, for the first time, posed an existential threat to the Colombian state. Moreover, the failure of the UP

¹³ While others use the term “cartel” to refer to drug gangs, some have argued that this is a misapplication due to the frequent (and often violent) competition between them. Accordingly, I use “gang” throughout for clarity of terms.

and peaceful reconciliation led the FARC-EP to use increasingly brutal tactics towards civilians throughout the country, especially in areas under their control (Harris, 2001).

In the interest of resolving the conflict, President Andrés Pastrana granted the FARC-EP a 42,000 km² “safe haven” as a confidence-building measure for peace talks between the guerillas and the Colombian government (Molano, 2000). This was the FARC-EP’s high-water mark as an insurgency. The peace talks eventually fell apart in 2002 after both sides were unable or unwilling to observe the cease-fire, and the coming years would see the FARC-EP recede back into the mountainous terrain from whence they came.

The Arrival of Paramilitaries

While Colombia is no stranger to para-institutional violence, the phenomenon had yet to play a major part in Colombia’s civil conflict until around 1997, when the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC) was officially formed through a merger of several local right-wing militia organizations. Many of these were holdovers from the right-wing militias that played a major hand in combatting drug organizations such as Pablo Escobar’s infamous Medellín gang (Brittain, 2008). These organizations saw themselves as protectors of the status quo, engaging in the kinds of violence and intimidation that the state could not¹⁴. In 2005, head of the AUC Salvatore Mancuso stated, “History will recognize the goodness and greatness of our cause. We are defenders of a free Colombia and its institutions.” (Leech, 2004) While many of these local paramilitary organizations financed themselves via the drug trade, they also received at least tacit support from economic elites and the state itself (Brittain, 2008).

¹⁴ This is more than just perception, as some have noted a substitution effect wherein paramilitaries have increasingly engaged in “dirty” antsubversive operations. As such, “government forces have been able to improve their human rights performance while the anti-insurgent side of the war as a whole has still been able to maintain inherently dirty anti-infrastructure activities” (Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas 2004)

To some degree, the AUC's entrance into Colombia's civil war was a response to the FARC-EP's ascendance during the 1990's. As the FARC-EP continued to consolidate territory throughout the Colombian countryside, the remnants of the paramilitary organizations that had taken over the drug trade in the wake of the Medellín gang's demise saw their territory (and profits) shrink. Likewise, Colombian elites (especially landowners) feared the ramifications of potential settlement terms with the ascendant FARC-EP, as many of their demands centered on combatting inequality of income and land ownership. Thus, Colombian elites and paramilitary groups found themselves with a common cause: eliminating the threat of left-wing guerilla groups.

In many ways, this strategy mimicked the one used to combat Escobar's Medellín gang. Paramilitaries engaged in a massive campaign of violence against left-wing guerillas and their sympathizers with ever-increasing brutality (Leech, 2004). This campaign, along with the increasing sophistication of the Colombian military (assisted by the United States) helped to force the FARC-EP back into the mountains and jungles, ending their existential threat to the Colombian state. The AUC was officially disbanded in 2006, although many local right-wing militias still exist, some of which still brandish the AUC moniker.

The period from 1996 until 2006 stands out as one of the most brutal episodes of Colombia's history. Territorial control became paramount, as it generated the resources necessary to fund each side of the conflict. Both the FARC-EP as well as the AUC garnered resources from the drug trade, but the AUC also systematically engaged in appropriating land and other resources from local populations, later selling them off to large landholders. As a result, Colombia currently has the most unequal distribution of land in Latin America, with an estimated 1.15% of landowners controlling 52.2% of arable land (Summers, 2011).

While there are a great deal of differences between pro-government militias such as the AUC and dissident groups like the FARC-EP, I argue that they both share an objective which incentivizes

them to engage in the forced displacement of civilians: the need to exert lasting control over specific portions of territory. As noted by other scholars, territorial control is one of the most important factors in determining the potential for dissident groups to achieve success in civil wars. By holding specific portions of territory, dissident groups are able to evade government targeting, build their local support base, and gather resources (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2008). Moreover, the importance of narcotrafficking to the FARC-EP's resource base only serves to increase the need for territorial control due to the profitable nature of coca fields and drug smuggling corridors.

Pro-government militias such as the AUC face similar incentives to control territory, but for slightly different reasons. As mentioned previously, the AUC also relies on the drug trade to add to its resource base. Moreover, the AUC has taken to selling land appropriated from forced migrants, a profitable enterprise which has also led to skyrocketing inequality of land ownership in Colombia (Summers, 2011). Lastly, while the AUC's relationship with the Colombian state is somewhat nebulous, AUC control over territory has been shown to give them power over the appointment of local government officials (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos-Villagran, 2013). In sum, while both groups differ in terms of their goals, ideology, and membership (Sanín, 2008), their status as non-state actors in the midst of civil war presents them with strong incentives to displace civilians from the territories under their control.

Hypotheses

I predict that displacement is most pronounced when armed groups (particularly non-state actors) seek to assert control over specific portions of territory. In Colombia, all the relevant actors placed a primacy on controlling territory, as it brought along the necessary resources for continued fighting. The existence of multiple non-state actors allows me to investigate the degree to which displacement is a common strategy utilized by non-state actors generally, rather than one particular

group, ideology, or alignment. In addition, there are multiple instances of conflict *between* non-state actors, allowing me to investigate how these instances might differ from more traditional civil war dynamics in terms of how it affects internal displacement.

As asserted above, I theorize internal displacement as the result of non-state actors attempting to solidify their hold on territory. I argue that this occurs for two main reasons: First, forcing perceived ideological enemies to relocate elsewhere carries a number of benefits for the armed group currently controlling the territory in question. Costs are imposed on enemies (normally the state) while the ideological makeup of the territory in question becomes more homogenous and favorable to the actor inducing displacement. Secondly, internally displaced persons are likely the result of actions taken by non-state actors since those victimized by the state are more likely to leave the country entirely to escape victimization. Moreover, the advantages of inducing displacement are less clear for states; when one is seeking to control the entire territory of the state, inducing displacement may create more problems than it solves.

The state/non-state dichotomy is complicated by the existence of pro-government militias such as the AUC. While the effects of wide-spread internal displacement run counter to the goals of states, I argue that even pro-government militias are incentivized to engage in internal displacement despite the fact that it runs counter to the goals of their allies.

As stated in Chapter 2, civilians decide to leave their homes when the expected value of leaving outweighs the expected value of remaining within their community. Perhaps the most important factor influencing this decision is civilians' *expectations of victimization*, defined as an individual's relative probability of becoming a victim of violence given that he/she remains in a given area. Key to forming this expectation is the degree to which the area's dominant belligerent engages in violence; while the relationship between civilian and belligerent might be acrimonious, displacement is unlikely to occur unless belligerents pose a credible threat to civilians residing in

areas under their control. Therefore, I expect that levels of internal displacement will rise along with levels of violence against civilians, especially when non-state actors commit said violence.

Hypothesis 1: Violent actions by non-state belligerents will be associated with higher levels of internal displacement than violent actions committed by the state.

As outlined above, I expect that internal displacement comes about largely as a result of non-state actors attempting to consolidate their hold on specific pieces of territory. Accordingly, I expect that internal displacement will increase in areas controlled by non-state actors.

Hypothesis 2: Territories controlled by non-state actors will experience higher levels of internal displacement than territories controlled by the state

As mentioned above, the Colombian civil war provides a unique opportunity to investigate areas of conflict between multiple non-state actors, and how that dynamic affects trends of internal displacement. I theorize that internal displacement is more a response to violence by non-state actors attempting to gain control over distinct pieces of territory than state actors targeting civilians. This effect should be increased if multiple non-state actors are contesting the same piece of territory, since both sides will be incentivized to displace civilians in order to increase their hold on the territory in question.

Hypothesis 3: An increase in the number of non-state belligerent actors present in a given area will be associated with higher levels of internal displacement in that area.

Finally, recall that civilians' expectations of victimization are influenced by "identifiability," or the degree to which their allegiances can be identified solely via observation. Even in conflicts that mobilize for reasons other than ethnic or cultural divisions, membership in one or another ethnic group can still connote political allegiances and thereby expose civilians to potential victimization. Therefore, I expect that areas with large minority populations will be exposed to higher levels of internal displacement.

H4: Areas of high ethnic diversity will be associated with higher levels of internal displacement.

Data

The unit of observation for my hypothesis tests is the municipality-year. I included all of the Colombian municipalities for which relevant data could be obtained.¹⁵ The result is a dataset containing 9,958 municipality-years covering 1,108 of Colombia's 1,118 municipalities during the time period 1998-2006.¹⁶

The dependent variable is an estimate of the number of internally displaced persons who fled a given municipality in a given year. This data is compiled by the researchers at the *Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos* (Resource Center for the Analysis of Conflicts, or CERAC), a Colombian research group focused on armed conflict. Data on internal displacement is notoriously hard to come by. To the degree that such data is available, it tends to be constructed via convenience samples: data collected without an underlying random selection process, which can be unrepresentative of the universe of relevant cases (Gohdes and Price 2013; Davenport and Ball 2002). Recognizing this, the team at CERAC utilized an innovative technique known as "mark and recapture" in order to build an unbiased estimate of internal displacement.

¹⁵ Ten municipalities were so remote or inaccessible that they lack data on one or more variables.

¹⁶ A table of descriptive statistics on all the variables used is contained in Appendix B.

“Mark and recapture” is a method originally developed within the field of ecology that recognizes the inherent problem of estimating populations that are difficult or impossible to estimate via conventional survey methods. In the case of internal displacement in Colombia, the nature of the population is such that there is no existing list of all the people displaced during Colombia’s civil war, nor is there

representative survey data that would allow for an estimation of IDPs utilizing conventional survey methods.

Mark and recapture utilizes the overlap between different existing samples in order to estimate the amount of cases that were not captured by any existing sample. If




Figure 3: Internal Displacement in Colombia, 1998-2006

individuals within the existing samples can be matched across different lists (by name, age, or other characteristic), the rate at which they appear on the existing samples can be used to construct an estimate of the amount of individuals that were not captured by any existing sample¹⁷. In this case, the researchers at CERAC compared lists of internally displaced persons from eight different sources (including a number of NGOs as well as the Colombian state) in order to construct an unbiased estimator of internal displacement at the municipality level.

Figure 2 shows the national-level trend of internal displacement during the time period being studied. While the data is temporally limited to the years 1998-2006, it covers the modern peak of internal displacement in Colombia (2002, which saw over 850,000 people displaced from their homes), as well as the years directly surrounding it.

¹⁷ For a more detailed explanation of the “mark and recapture” technique, see Fienberg (1992).

Independent Variables

To test my hypotheses regarding the effects of belligerent actions on internal displacement, I constructed a number of indicators of belligerent activity from the data collected by CERAC and contained in their *Base de Datos sobre el Conflicto Armado de Colombia* (Database on the Colombian Armed Conflict, or BDCAC). The BDCAC's data on wartime violence is an ongoing project, collecting data from two primary sources. First, researchers at CERAC compiled data from more than 20 newspapers with either a national or regional focus. Second, researchers at CERAC included reports gathered by members of multiple human rights NGOs, local public ombudsmen, and a national network of Catholic clergy known as the *Comisión Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz* (Inter-Congregational Commission of Justice and Peace). The Catholic network in particular is noted for its penetration into even the most remote regions of Colombia, giving credence to the accuracy and coverage of the data (Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas, 2004).

Recall that Hypothesis One predicts a positive association between violence perpetrated by non-state actors and internal displacement. The BDCAC contains dummy variables indicating the presence of reports (corroborated by at least one other source) of violent activity in a given municipality committed by the various groups involved in the conflict (separated as State, Guerillas, and Paramilitaries). To construct an indicator of non-state belligerent violent activity, I created a dummy variable (*Non-State Activity*) which takes the value of 1 if either guerilla or paramilitary forces were reported to have committed violent acts within a given municipality in a given year and 0 otherwise.¹⁸ Likewise, I utilized the BDCAC indicator for violent activity committed by state forces

¹⁸ Some may contest the decision to lump guerillas and paramilitaries with one another. I argue that despite their many differences, guerillas and paramilitaries are similarly incentivized to engage in forced displacement. Therefore, I group belligerents based on the characteristic of interest: Whether the belligerent in question is a state or non-state actor.

(*State Activity*), which similarly takes a value of 1 if state forces were reported to have committed violent acts within the given municipality-year.

As enumerated in my theory on internal displacement, I hypothesize that internal displacement also responds to dynamics of territorial control. Hypothesis Two predicts a positive relationship between increasing non-state actor control over territory and internal displacement. The BDCAC's variables on territorial control are constructed by comparing reports of the presence of belligerent groups to one another. Where reports indicate the presence of only one group, said group was considered to exercise uncontested control of the municipality in question. Where more than one group was reported to have conducted activity in the given municipality, the total reports on each group were compared to one another so as to construct a ratio (from 0 to 1) of territorial control. For example, if reports of activities from Group A exceeded those of group B at a rate of 2:1, the BDCAC would code the ratio of territorial control between the groups at .66.

I utilized this data on territorial control to construct dummy variables (*Non-State Control* and *State Control*) which take the value of 1 if the group concerned either a) exercised a majority of control over the municipality in question (greater than .5), or b) exercised uncontested control over the municipality in question. Accordingly, these variables serve to indicate territorial control by armed groups. Lastly, I created the variable *Stalemate* to indicate whether control of a given municipality was evenly split between two or more groups.

Hypothesis Three predicts an increase in internal displacement in areas contested by multiple non-state actors. To investigate the relationship between territorial contestation and internal displacement, I utilized indicators of territorial control from the BDCAC. *State-Nonstate Conflict* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Colombian state forces were actively in conflict with one or more non-state actors in the given municipality within the given year. *Nonstate-Nonstate Conflict* is a dummy variable indicating whether guerilla and paramilitary forces were actively in conflict with one

another within a given municipality within a given year. If so, this variable takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise.

Hypothesis Four predicts that internal displacement will be positively associated with increases in ethnic diversity. As such, I include the absolute number of indigenous persons in a given municipality (*Indigenous Population*) as well as the absolute number of afro-Colombian persons in a given municipality (*Afro-Colombian Population*). This data comes from the 2005 Colombian census (DANE, 2005) and is strictly cross-sectional. As of now, the 2005 census is the only record of ethnic population totals at the municipal level that exists during the time period in question. While a count of ethnic population totals that varied from year to year would be preferable, such is impossible. Utilizing one year of data is of course suboptimal, but should give at least a rough sketch of the effect of ethnic diversity on internal displacement.

Control Variables

I utilize a number of control variables that have been proposed elsewhere as predictors of displacement. First, I used the GDP of the department that corresponds to the given municipality, as gathered by the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), measured in billions of 2005 Colombian pesos. While municipal-level data would be preferable, such data does not exist for the time period in question. As such, including department-level GDP gives at least a rough sense of the effects of regional wealth on internal displacement.

I also control for the mean elevation of the department in which a given municipality is located. Since higher elevation implies rougher terrain, the expectation is that a higher mean elevation will lead to fewer persons displaced, simply because the act of relocation becomes more costly in remote, mountainous areas.

Lastly, I include percentage of the vote for the major candidates representing both the left and right sides of the political spectrum (as two separate variables), as of the most recent presidential election.¹⁹ This is intended to control for the presence of “collective targeting” as theorized by Steele (2009, 2011, 2012), who proposed that armed groups utilize election results to identify ideologically opposed populations, who are then targeted for displacement. While municipal election results would again be preferable, such results are not available for the time period in question.

Results

A random-effects negative binomial model was used to assess the impacts of the variables discussed above on the total amount of internally displaced persons fleeing a given municipality during a given year. Table 1 reports the incidence-rate ratios (IRRs) and standard errors for each of the independent variables. Incidence-rate ratios express the size of expected change in the dependent variable, given a one-unit increase in the given independent variable. For example, an independent variable (X) with values of (0, 1) and an IRR of 1.12 means that observations where X = 1 will, on average and controlling for other independent variables, have 1.12 times the number of “incidents” (in this case, internally displaced persons) than observations where X=0. Therefore, an IRR greater than 1 expresses a positive effect, while IRRs less than 1 express a negative effect of the independent variable in question.

Hypothesis One predicts that violent acts committed by non-state actors will be associated with higher levels of internal displacement than violent actions committed by the state. However, violence seems to induce displacement regardless of the actor responsible, as violent actions from

¹⁹ For the time period covered in this study (1998-2006), there were three relevant presidential elections in Colombia: 1997, 2002, and 2006. Candidates were chosen as “left” or “right” based on a) their inclusion within the top 3 vote-getters at the national level, and b) their ideological relationship with the other candidates within that top 3.

state actors produce positive and stronger effects than violent actions from non-state actors. While the IRR for “Non-State Activity” (a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if violent attacks have

Table 3: Results, Negative Binomial Model

Covariate	Incidence Rate Ratio	Standard Error
Non-State Activity	1.176***	0.049
State Activity	1.558***	0.077
State-Nonstate Conflict	0.778*	0.088
Nonstate-Nonstate Conflict	1.412***	0.079
Non-State Control	1.228***	0.063
State Control	1.06	0.102
Stalemate	0.909*	0.043
Indigenous Population	0.999	0.818
Afro-Colombian Population	1.000003***	0.000000008
Elevation	0.999***	0.00003
% Left Vote	2.852***	0.463
% Right Vote	12.561***	1.896
Departmental GDP	0.999***	0.0000000124
Population	1.000001***	0.000000001
N = 9958		
* Indicates significance at 0.05 level in a two-tailed test.		
** Indicates significance at 0.01 level in a two-tailed test.		
*** Indicates significance at a .001 level in a two-tailed test.		

been attributed to non-state actors) is significant at $p > .001$ and greater than 1, the IRR for “State Activity” is similarly significant and even larger, suggesting that the effects of belligerent violence actually run opposite of what is suggested by Hypothesis One. Upon further review, this may be due

to the Colombian state's high propensity for violence: According to the BDCAC, the Colombian state exceeded all other actors in terms of its propensity for violence (more acts were committed by the state than any other actor). This propensity for violence combined with the Colombian military's superior capacity may explain the disparity between the sizes of the effects of belligerent violence on internal displacement.

Despite this, the results present evidence to show that internal displacement is a systematic and strategic goal of non-state actors seeking to gain control over territory. Moreover, this effect seems to hold as non-state actors gain control over territory. As the balance of territorial control begins to favor non-state actors (Non-State Control), levels of internal displacement can be expected to rise ($p < .001$). This lends support to Hypothesis Two, which predicts that increasing levels of territorial control by non-state actors will lead to more internally displaced persons. Conversely, I do not find a similar relationship between state territorial control (State Control) and internal displacement, suggesting that non-state actors have a unique propensity to induce displacement as a strategy of consolidation.

Moreover, conflicts between non-state actors seem to increase levels of internal displacement. Recall that Hypothesis Three predicts that areas contested by multiple non-state actors will be subject to higher levels of internal displacement. While areas subject to conflict between state and non-state actors (State-Nonstate Conflict) tend to produce *fewer* IDPs ($p < .05$), areas contested by multiple non-state actors are far more likely to experience high levels of internal displacement ($p < .001$), lending support to Hypothesis Two.

Hypothesis Four predicts that increasing levels of ethnic diversity make it easier for belligerents to identify and target potential ideological enemies, thereby lowering the costs of displacement and increasing its overall levels. As seen in Table One, I find partial support for this hypothesis. While the number of indigenous persons present in a given municipality has an

insignificant effect on the number of persons displaced, the number of Afro-Colombian persons has a positive and significant effect ($p < .001$) on the scale of displacement.

Conclusions

As noted at the outset of this chapter, the nature of displacement begets the need to turn to sub-national investigation to present a more nuanced picture of its precipitating factors.

Accordingly, the findings presented here are mixed, somewhat contradicting the straightforward relationship between perpetrating actor and choice of relocation proposed in previous chapters. Rather than internal displacement being strictly caused by non-state actors, it appears that the Colombian government was indeed responsible for a good deal of the internal displacement that still plagues the country. While this is in contrast to the theoretical implications presented in Chapter Two and the evidence presented in Chapter Three, I believe that government-induced internal displacement can still fit within the general theory presented in this dissertation.

First, note that displacement by government actors seems to be tied directly to violence against civilians. As stated above, it appears that violence against civilians tends to cause internal displacement regardless of the actor responsible. This makes intuitive sense; one would expect that civilians faced with acts of violence perpetrated against fellow civilians might be compelled to migrate. Perhaps we can think of this violence as “indiscriminate” (as per Kalyvas 2006) in nature; for whatever reason, civilians in Village X are targeted and choose to migrate. For those targeted indiscriminately, their expectation of victimization is tied inextricably to their location rather than their relationship to one or another actor. As such, civilians displaced in this manner might thus feel safe migrating to other portions of the country even when victimized by the government, as relocation would remove the primary factor of victimization.

Second, note that territorial contestation or control by non-state actors seems to lead to displacement, even when controlling for acts of violence against civilians. This displacement would seem to be related to territorial consolidation rather than acts of violence, and accords well with the theory presented in this dissertation. Turning again to the dynamics presented in Kalyvas (2006), we can think of this sort of displacement as dependent on selective rather than indiscriminate violence. Seeking to remove potential defectors or other opponents to the local belligerent, actors target specific individuals (or categories of individuals) for displacement and/or victimization. As such, these individuals are forced to migrate once the non-state actor in question begins to exercise a majority of control in the given area. This form of displacement seems to unfold as predicted by the theory presented in this dissertation: non-state actors have a particular incentive to induce displacement within territories they control, while states (rightly) see these actions as counter-productive.

This more nuanced process of displacement could also explain part of the effect of the time lag employed in Chapter Three. There, I proposed that, at the aggregate national level, information about war-time violence would take time to filter into the public information set and thereby influence overall levels of displacement as civilians update their expectations of victimization. Perhaps this lag could relate more to the degree to which non-state belligerents consolidate or increase their territorial gains over time. Regardless, the findings presented in this and the previous chapter shed light on the degree to which territorial consolidation relates to forced migration.

This chapter also investigated the degree to which ethnicity can influence internal displacement, and likewise found more nuanced results than those presented in Chapter Three. While there was a positive effect for Afro-Colombian populations on internal displacement, there was no such significant effect for indigenous populations. I suspect that this is due to salience; While the proposed effect of ethnic or cultural diversity does indeed hold for Afro-Colombians in the

Colombian Civil War, indigenous populations are less affected due to their general location being removed from areas of territorial contestation.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ON CIVIL WAR DURATION

Far from a simple humanitarian disaster, internal displacement can have serious consequences relating to the outcome of civil wars themselves. As discussed in Chapter Two, the displacement of civilians from conflict-affected areas can facilitate the spread of arms, ideology and grievance to more peaceful areas of the state. Moreover, forced migration can expand (geographically) the social networks of belligerents, allowing them to reach parts of the state that were previously inaccessible. In terms of a theoretical mechanism, this argument closely resembles that of Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Salehyan (2008): the process of forced migration can lead to conflict in areas of resettlement. However, while these articles focused on the degree to which refugees from conflict zones can increase the probability of new conflict in neighboring states, my argument proposes that *internal* displacement can increase the length and intensity of ongoing civil conflicts.

Beyond contributing to the spread of arms, ideology, and grievance, wide-scale internal displacement can affect the relative capabilities of belligerents within a civil conflict. First, the existence of large IDP populations can stress the resource base of governments attempting to care for them, thereby decreasing their ability to contribute resources to fighting the ongoing conflict. Should governments withhold this aid, they face the potential political costs of allowing a humanitarian crisis to continue unabated, as well as facing the grievances of local populations affected by the spread of forced migrants. In either case, internal displacement can impose serious costs on entities attempting to administer the territory to which migrants relocate.

Forced migrants can also affect the relative capacity of belligerents by becoming fighters themselves. As identified by Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), citizens at risk may find that joining an armed group leads to tangible benefits including income, safety, and personal agency. Civilians

facing the potential for victimization (or in the case of IDPs, a history of victimization) may thus be more likely to join armed groups in order to find safety. Armed groups are certainly aware that forced migrants are attractive candidates, as humanitarian aid camps are often sites for recruitment and/or conscription (Achvarina and Reich, 2006). There is some evidence that forced migrants can come to constitute a significant chunk of the fighting force of belligerent groups; As of 2005, nearly 30% of all combatants (across all groups) in the Colombian civil war were either related to an IDP or were IDPs themselves (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2007).

Given the above, I propose that the presence of large numbers of IDPs can exacerbate ongoing civil wars, prolonging their resolution. In this way, I hope to show that internal displacement is more than just a pernicious side-effect of civil wars, but rather a pernicious cycle adding fuel to the fire of civil conflict by weakening the state and strengthening non-state actors. As such, I expect that civil conflicts leading to large amounts of internal displacement will take longer to resolve due to the above factors.

H1: Civil conflicts with high levels of internal displacement will last longer than conflicts with comparatively lower levels of internal displacement.

Data and Research Design

To investigate whether internal displacement actually does prolong civil wars, I utilized data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (Gleditsch et al, 2002), adapted to survival analysis by Gates and Strand (2004). So as to include low-intensity conflicts, the battle casualty threshold used by the UCDP is twenty-five, as opposed to the higher thresholds used in other data sources. As such, the data includes 136 unique conflicts between 1989 and 2003, and the dependent variable is the duration of civil conflicts (measured in days).

The unit of observation for this study is each individual civil war, not the country in which they occurred. As such, the data allows for the analysis of countries in which multiple conflicts were ongoing at any given time. Moreover, the more precise measurement of conflict duration (measured in days rather than years) allows for a more precise analysis that includes conflicts lasting less than a year in total.

Independent Variable

The primary independent variable for this study is a measure of the number of internally displaced persons (x1000) present in a given country at the end of a given year. This data is compiled in the Forcibly Displaced Populations (FDP) dataset, which utilizes information from the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants' *World Refugee Survey*, whose internal displacement counts were compiled with the assistance of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

As discussed in Chapter Three, raw counts of internal displacement can vary widely from conflict to conflict. Moreover, the data suffer from a few notable outliers: For example, the civil conflict in Sudan resulted in an estimated five million IDPs in 1992; a number that is 5.6 standard deviations above the global mean of 534,852. Likewise, the conflict in Mozambique led to an estimated 3.5 million IDPs in the same year; itself 3.8 standard deviations above the global mean. So as to dampen the effect of these outliers, a logged value of IDPs is used for the primary analysis, although a raw count used for robustness did not significantly alter the results.

Control Variables

This analysis uses a battery of standard control variables that can conceivably affect the duration of civil conflict. First, I utilize the Scalar Index of Politics (SIP) from Gates et al (2006).

This is used in order to correct for the inherent endogeneity problem of using Polity data to analyze civil conflict (Gates et al 2006; Vreeland 2008). Since political “factionalism” (which includes civil conflict) is part of the Polity coding scheme, an analysis of civil conflict utilizing Polity would, in effect, place civil conflict on both sides of the equation. The coding scheme of the SIP data (described more fully in Gates et al 2006) corrects for this inherent endogeneity problem. To further avoid the problem of reverse causality, this indicator is set at its value in the year prior to the outbreak of conflict. Relative wealth is also controlled for in terms of GDP per capita, updated from Gleditsch (2002). Again, this value is fixed at its value in the year prior to the outbreak of conflict.

The existence of valuable and easily extractable natural resources can provide a source of funding for non-state actors, thereby increasing their relative capacity and ability to sustain fighting (Lujala 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). As such, I utilize “dummy” indicators of the presence of both gemstones (including diamonds as well as others such as ruby, sapphires, opal and jade) as well as drug cultivation (including poppy, coca, and cannabis). The geo-referenced data was collected from Diadata (Gilmore et al. 2005) and Gemdata (Flöter, Lujala and Rød 2007) and compiled by Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009). Data on drug cultivation (at the time of civil war outbreak) was drawn from Lujala (2002).

As first identified in Fearon and Laitin (2003), the existence of rugged terrain can favor the continued operation of insurgent forces, thereby prolonging civil wars. Therefore, I utilize two indicators of mountainous and forested terrain. These values are included separately and expressed as a percentage of the conflict area covered by the given type of terrain. Gridded forest data were provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), while data on mountains were gathered by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Both were compiled into survival-analysis format by Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009).

As noted by Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2009), the fighting capacity of government forces decreases as government forces move away from the capital city. Likewise, separatist (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000) and “sons-of-the-soil” conflicts (Fearon 2004) are theorized to be more durable than others, and as such I include an indicator of the distance between a conflict center and the capital of the country in question. These distances are estimated via a geodesic distance calculator²⁰ and compiled by Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009). This also helps to control for separatist and “sons-of-the-soil” conflicts, since (by definition) they occur in areas far removed from the capital. Given the variability of these distance measurements, the natural log of the distance between the conflict center and the capital is used here.

Finally, I control for the relative fighting capacity of rebel forces, provided by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). A wealth of studies have indicated the prominence of rebel fighting capacity in prolonging civil wars (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). This indicator is measured conceptually as the ability of rebels to “effectively engage the army militarily and win battles.” Empirically, this measure codes fighting capacity into three categories: weak, moderate, and strong. So as to improve the fit of the data, this measure was reworked into a dichotomous indicator of rebel fighting capacity: rebel groups coded as “weak” were given a value of 0, while “moderate” or “strong” rebels were given a value of 1.

Model

As per Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch (2009), the majority of conflicts can take one of two characters (as regards duration): Rebels with a high fighting capacity (in terms of their ability to effectively engage government forces) tend to lead to shorter conflicts, while relatively weak rebels seek to draw conflicts out over a longer period of time. The Weibull distribution allows for

²⁰ For more on this specific procedure, see Buhaug and Gates (2002)

both of these possibilities: the “hazard” of war termination can either be high in the initial stages and decrease steadily after, or it can begin low and increase over time. As this distribution accords well with our knowledge of civil conflicts, it has become a fairly standard method for analyzing conflict duration.

Results and Discussion

Below, I present the effects of the aforementioned explanatory variables across several model specifications. Table 1 presents the results for three different models, reporting the Weibull accelerated failure-time (AFT) coefficients. The interpretation of these coefficients is simple: Positive values indicate longer conflict duration, while negative coefficients mean shorter duration. Observations are clustered on countries. Model 1 presents the baseline model for conflict duration, while Model 2 adds an indicator of rebel fighting capacity. Model 3 adds indicators for both gems and drugs. All models include controls for democracy, wealth, and rough terrain. All three model specifications lend credence to the general hypothesis postulated in this chapter, as the effect of internal displacement on civil war duration is positive and significant in all three model specifications.

To my knowledge, this is the first study to find that internal displacement can in fact lead to an increase in overall civil war duration. The effect of internal displacement on civil war resolution could be due to a number of theoretical mechanisms: an increase in internal displacement can induce economic pressure on previously stable communities, thereby increasing levels of grievance throughout the territory of the country in question. This increase in grievance could lead to an increase in conflict duration by affecting recruiting and the relative fighting capacity of both sides. Additionally, the added economic and political pressure on individual communities could stress the

resource base of governments attempting to fight a civil war while also dealing with rising unemployment and an ongoing humanitarian crisis.

Table 4: Event History Analysis of Conflict Duration, 1989-2003

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
IDPs (ln)	0.129** (0.059)	0.124** (0.06)	0.117** (0.059)
Democracy score at onset	0.931* (0.539)	0.976** (0.491)	1.000** (0.493)
Distance from Capital (ln)	0.378*** (0.124)	0.397*** (0.137)	0.400*** (0.137)
GDP/capita at onset (ln)	-0.354* (0.293)	-0.367 (0.299)	-0.32 (0.297)
Mountains in conflict zone (%)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Forest in conflict zone (%)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)
Rebel fighting capacity		-0.546 (0.358)	-0.547 (0.361)
Gems in conflict zone			0.415 (0.303)
Drug cultivation in conflict zone			-0.161 (0.416)
Constant	6.793 (1.922)***	7.216 (1.849)***	6.824 (1.874)***
Log pseudolikelihood	-216.014	-186.795	-191.502
Number of conflicts: 136 Number of failures: 113 Observations: 587 Estimates based on Weibull accelerated failure-time regression. Robust absolute z statistics, clustered on countries, in parentheses. * denotes significance at 90 percent confidence level ** denotes significance at 95 percent confidence level *** denotes significance at 99 percent confidence level			

However, there are a number of other potential avenues through which internal displacement could lead to an increase in civil war duration. First, as mentioned previously, an increase in internal displacement could provide a recruitment base for non-state actors looking to capitalize on an aggrieved and vulnerable population. Second, the mass migration of civilians from

conflict-affected areas of the state can expand belligerent social networks and spread potentially conflictual ideology, a mechanism identified by Gleditsch and Salehyan (2006) as well as Salehyan (2008) in their studies of the effects of refugee inflows on neighboring states.

I also replicate the results presented in Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) by showing that an increase in a conflict's distance from the capital city does indeed lead to longer civil wars. As noted above, this accords well with other studies in the literature that identify separatist (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000) or "sons-of-the-soil" (Fearon 2004) conflicts as having a positive impact on civil war duration.

At present, data and resource limitations prevent the full testing of the above theoretical mechanisms for the effect of internal displacement on civil war termination. However, conflict researchers as well as practitioners should heed the analysis presented in this chapter. Internal displacement is far more than an unfortunate side-effect of civil conflicts; high levels of internal displacement can forestall the timely resolution of civil conflicts themselves. This result is especially important given the recent trend in displacement totals worldwide: estimates as of January 2016 place the global total of IDPs at 40.3 million people, more than twice the global total of refugees (IDMC, 2016). Moreover, while the global total of refugees has slowly declined from its heights in the early 1990s (around 20 million in 1993), the global total of IDPs has more than doubled since 1998 (IDMC, 2016). Given the results presented in this and the preceding chapters, the global rise in internal displacement may be an important factor in prolonging contemporary civil wars; one that should be of paramount importance for those wishing to bring civil conflicts to a quicker and less bloody end.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation further refines our collective understanding of the processes leading to internal displacement while also highlighting its potential effects. If the goal of forced migration studies is to assist practitioners in developing a predictive model, this project moves us some steps closer to that goal. I improve on previous studies of internal displacement by showing that sources of violence matter, and that the process giving rise to refugees is not necessarily the same process that gives rise to internally displaced persons. Second, I demonstrate the importance of territorial control and how it influences forced migration flows. Finally, I present evidence to suggest that the threat of victimization is not felt homogeneously across ethnicity and culture, thus leading more diverse populations to experience higher levels of internal displacement.

In a general sense, the findings presented in this dissertation replicate the straightforward relationship between one-sided violence and displacement that has been produced elsewhere in the literature. While the results in the latter are mixed, Chapters Three and Four introduce a great deal of nuance heretofore undiscovered regarding the process of displacement and its relationship to both sources of violence and territorial control. First, territorial control by non-state actors seems to be an important predictor of whether displacement becomes widespread during the course of a civil conflict. In civil conflicts without such territorial dynamics, the threats presented to civilians seem to not be sufficient to give rise to forced migration on the wide scale seen in other conflicts. Second, non-state violence seems to be the primary driver of internal displacement at the aggregate (state) level, as shown in Chapter Three. However, this picture becomes more complex at the local level, where direct violence perpetrated by the state can indeed lead to internal displacement.

Non-state violence seems to perpetrate displacement as well, but non-state actors also seem to engage in a more targeted, selective form of displacement when expanding or consolidating their

hold on territory. States, needing to control the whole of their territory and thus not benefitting from this kind of systematized displacement, are less likely to engage in the displacement of civilians while consolidating their hold on territory. In Chapter Four, there is some evidence to suggest that internal displacement goes down in areas where states and non-state actors contest the same portion of territory, perhaps because states exert extra effort in protecting local civilians, or perhaps because non-state actors lack the access to present a sustained threat to local civilians.

Finally, this project presents evidence that both scholars and policymakers should pay heed to the role of ethnic or cultural heterogeneity as it affects patterns of displacement. In conflicts wherein affinity towards one or another group can be determined or ascribed by belligerent groups on the basis of membership in an ethnic or cultural group, we should expect to see higher levels of displacement as information costs are lowered for belligerents seeking to displace potential defectors. Moreover, this effect should hold, even in conflicts that are not specifically ethnic in nature.

Beyond simply adding to the scholarly literature on forced migration, this project serves a societal importance in terms of its contribution to the understanding of a global forced migration crisis. At present, the global total of forced migrants is larger than it has ever been, reflecting an uptick in global population as well as the kinds of conflicts which seem to lead to the forced displacement of civilian populations. It is my hope that the findings presented in this dissertation can contribute to the resolution of this crisis, both by increasing the ability of practitioners to anticipate forced migration crises where they are about to break out, and by highlighting the adverse effects of forced migration when it is allowed to continue unabated.

To highlight the contributions of this dissertation, let us compare the two civil conflicts which (as of this writing) have the world's highest totals of internally displaced persons. The conflicts in Syria and Colombia have led to a total of 6.6 million and 6.27 million internally displaced

persons, respectively (IDMC, 2016). At a glance, standing theories of forced migration would be hard-pressed to explain why these two conflicts have produced similar levels of displacement given their disparate levels of violence. Violence totals for the Syrian conflict are understandably hard to come by given the nature of the conflict, but estimates range from (as of this writing) 130,000 (VDC, 2016) to 400,000 killed (Al-Jazeera, 2016; SOHR, 2016) in just under five years of fighting. By comparison, the Colombian Civil War has produced an estimated 220,000 deaths over the entire course of the conflict, some 50-plus years (CNMH, 2014). In recent times, violence totals have been drastically lower than at the height of the conflict, following the official demobilization of paramilitary forces and the retreat of the FARC-EP.

Given this disparity in violence totals, extant research would have difficulty explaining why the two conflicts have produced similar totals of internally displaced persons, given the prevailing wisdom that violence is the primary cause of forced migration. This dissertation provides an answer to this counterintuitive result: the common factor between the Syrian and Colombian conflicts is the degree to which the non-state belligerents in each conflict have focused on the acquisition and consolidation of territory. As discussed in Chapter Four, territorial control has been of paramount importance to the various non-state actors involved in the Colombian armed conflict. In Colombia, control over distinct portions of territory has been a vital component in the acquisition of both resources and manpower. Likewise, Syria's main non-state belligerent Daesh (also known as ISIS/ISIL) has placed a similar emphasis on territorial control. As in the Colombian example, territorial control has provided Daesh with a wealth of resources and manpower critical to their viability as a challenger to the state. Moreover, territorial control is a central facet of their claim to legitimacy as an "Islamic State," a claim echoed in their motto of "*baqiya wa tatamaddad*," or "remaining and expanding." (Zelin, 2015).

More than just explaining why these two conflicts have produced similar levels of internal displacement, this dissertation lends some light as to why these two conflicts are (as of this writing) similarly intractable. Long considered as a humanitarian disaster, displacement should also be considered as a precipitant of further war. Not only does this provide scholars with a fruitful avenue for further study, but it should serve as a focal point for practitioners and potential interventionists: the act of protecting displaced populations could be crucial to bringing civil wars to a peaceful and swift end. In lieu of such protections, and with such massive totals of internally displaced persons, the findings of this dissertation suggest that Colombia and Syria face heretofore unrecognized stumbling blocks on the path to peace.

It is important to once again clarify the intent of this project as regards forced migrant populations. As noted in the introductory chapter, my greatest fear is that the conclusions presented here might be twisted to justify the unfortunately growing sentiment that forced migrant populations are some sort of burden or danger to the communities in which they resettle. Not only is this sentiment morally objectionable, but it runs counter to the wealth of evidence that, when properly cared for, forced migrant populations can be a boon to the communities in which they resettle. As such, I find it necessary to reiterate that this project should not be seen as a justification for rejecting forced migrants, but that it should be taken as further evidence to support the moral and practical necessity of providing sanctuary for victims of conflict and violence.

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 2



LLEGO LA HORA DE LA LIMPIEZA SOCIAL.

AHORA LE TOCA EL TURNO A LAS MALPARIDAS PUTAS BASQUERAS Y SIDOSAS, VENEDORES DE DROGAS, LADRONES CALLEJEROS Y APARTAMENTEROS, JALADORES DE CARROS, SECUESTRADORES Y JOVENES CONSUMIDORES

YA LOS TENEMOS IDENTIFICADOS

Para el pueblo en general, Ustedes han notado una creciente de la violencia, robos o ataques, prostitucion y consumo de droga... etc en los últimos tiempos, debido a todo esto nuestra organización ha tomado la irrevocable decisión de atacar la violencia con VIOLENCIA.

Ya no van a contagiar de SIDA a nadie más, solamente a los gusanos.
Tienen las horas contadas, todas las putas de los bares y cantinas y las malparidas prepagos.
Han contagiado a mucha gente de SIDA. Prepárense PUTAS...!

Todo malparido que se encuentre en estos bares después de las 10:00 PM no responderemos si caen inocentes.
Este más con su familia.

Jóvenes, no los queremos ver en las esquinas parchados drogándose, estamos en limpieza esto es serio. No consume droga, estudie más y esté con sus padres reciban sus consejos y los buenos ejemplos. Esto esta PODRIDO.

Vendedores de Drogas, últimamente se esta creciendo el negocio de hasta vender droga en las esquinas, ya no mas, métause esa droga por el CULO ARRIBA, no mas

Ladronzuelos, dejen trabajar a la sociedad. Pitas que están PILLADOS... JUICIO O MUERTE: USTED LO DECIDE... YA TENEMOS UNA LISTA DE BARRIDO INICIAL.

La organización lo ha decidido así, esta limpieza se necesita.



Empezaremos muy pronto, le pedimos perdón a la sociedad si caen inocentes.
ESTO ES SOLO POR UNOS MESES

SEÑOR PADRE DE FAMILIA ESTE MAS CON SUS HIJOS, NO SEA UNO DE ELLOS LOS QUE CAIGA EN ESTA LIMPIEZA... DIALOGEN.

Oghis.

Si Usted encuentra esta hoja, sáquele varias copias y repártalas a los amigos, vecinos, o a un familiar suyo que no caigan por no enterarse.

La organización no puede entregar esta hoja en cada casa, por eso pedimos su colaboración.

Figure 4: An Example of a Pamphlet from the AUC, Retrieved from the Chóco Region and Publicized by the Inter-Ecclesiastical Commission for Justice and Peace, a Colombian NGO (CIJP 2009)

Translation:

“NOW IS THE TIME FOR SOCIAL CLEANSING.

NOW IT IS THE BAD PEOPLES' TURN, THE CRACK-ADDICTS AND AIDS-INFECTED, DRUG DEALERS, STREET THIEVES AND HOMELESS, [people who clean car windows], KIDNAPPERS AND YOUNG [drug] CONSUMERS.

WE HAVE ALREADY IDENTIFIED THEM

For the people in general, you have noticed growing violence, theft and robbery, prostitution and drug use, etc. in recent times. Due to this, our organization has taken the irrevocable decision to attack violence with VIOLENCE.

They will no longer spread AIDS to anyone else, only to worms.

They have counted the hours, and all of the whores of the bars and cantinas and the bad people made pre-payments.

They have infected many people with AIDS. Prepare yourselves, BASTARDS!

All of the bad people we encounter in these bars after 10:00 PM cannot tell us they are innocent. Be with your family more.

Young people, we do not want to see you in the corners taking drugs, we are cleaning and this is serious. Don't take drugs, study more and be with your parents to receive their good advice and their good examples. This [current situation] is ROTTEN.

Drug dealers, this recent growing business of selling drugs on street corners is no more. Put those drugs UP YOUR ASS, no more.

Thieves, start to work for society. [All of you]²¹ will be caught. TRIAL OR DEATH; YOU DECIDE. WE HAVE A LIST FROM OUR INITIAL SWEEP.

The organization has decided, this cleaning is necessary.

We are beginning very soon, we ask forgiveness from society if they are innocent. THIS IS ONLY FOR A FEW MONTHS.

MISTER FATHER OF THE FAMILY, BE WITH YOUR CHILDREN MORE, YOU DON'T WANT ONE OF THEM TO BE CAUGHT IN THIS CLEANING. TALK TO THEM.

PS:

If you find this page, remove it and hand out several copies to friends, neighbors, or anyone you know so they aren't [caught] for failure to learn this.

The organization cannot deliver this sheet to every house, so we ask your cooperation."

²¹ *Pilas* is used here as "stack," often used as slang for an indefinite quantity or collection of abstract things.

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
IDPs	435.381	6784.54	0	383,090
<i>Pres_nonstate</i>	0.390	0.488	0	1
Pres_state	0.347	0.476	0	1
Conf_state_nonstate	0.288	0.453	0	1
Conf_paraguerilla	0.084	0.278	0	1
Favor_state	0.280	0.449	0	1
Favor_nonstate	0.096	0.294	0	1
stalemate	0.065	0.247	0	1
Number_indigenous	1,247.386	5,252.629	0	105,979
Number_afro	3,900.777	22,959.26	0	544,763
Elev_mean	1,138.859	691.5493	49.543	2,268.181
Left_vote	0.334	0.155	0	1
Right_vote	0.465	0.157	0	0.949
Departmental GDP	705,107.4	2,133,075	73	17,400,000
Population	37,048.470	230,375.3	4	6,740,859

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